

priority of the FSC. One example of this is the 1996 Dayton Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provides for comprehensive measures to reduce the risk of conflict and a rigorous verification and inspection process.¹⁵ During the first three years of implementation, there were no significant problems noted in over 130 inspections. The CSBM regime has been augmented by the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (concluded in June of 1996), which seeks to restrict and balance the force levels of Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). At first glance, military security appears to be significantly enhanced, particularly since the region has been in compliance with the arms control requirements of Dayton since October of 1997. Yet when examined in more detail, it is clear that the new entity's armed forces are still divided ethnically (with backing from Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), and that an unstable balance of power remains.¹⁶

While the CSBMs of the OSCE constitute an important tool of security, they do not always meet specific regional concerns. To address this gap, the FSC includes on its regular agenda a discussion of states' experience in bilateral and regional issues, and regularly updates a list of voluntary agreements. In this capacity, the FSC has encouraged regional CSBMs in the Baltic Sea area (which have been reasonably successful), between Greece and Turkey (which were very short-lived), and in Eastern Europe (Ukraine). The remaining challenge with regional CSBMs is ensuring a clear link to overall OSCE norms so as to avoid creating different degrees of security in the OSCE area in the context of the principle of "indivisibility of co-operative security" in the OSCE space.

However, two questions about regional CSBMs remain outstanding. First, it is debatable whether they can evolve into a real risk reduction measure, as opposed to what one OSCE delegation has called a "good weather instrument". Now that States have become "partners for peace", there is less need to enhance transparency in military matters or dispel mutual fears of aggression. What are needed instead are measures to deal with the risk of intra-state conflict, through early warning, fact-finding, and preventive diplomacy. Second, it is questionable whether the new Vienna Document can be more relevant in times of crisis management. The OSCE - as with all European security institutions - is still suffering from the continuing difficulty in managing the crises in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, and therefore may be less willing to invest resources in new and more intrusive CSBMs.¹⁷

¹⁵ The CSBMs covered in the agreement included: exchange of military information, notification and observation with respect to certain military activities, restrictions on deployments, and the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons.

¹⁶ There is a continuing relationship between the Bosnian Serb Army and the army of the FRY, and the Bosnian Croat section of the Federation Army still maintains its ties with Croatia. Also, the American 'train and equip' scheme, which was designed to help Federation forces to defend themselves against possible attack by forces from Serbia, has altered the military balance against the Serbs and in favour of the Federation.

¹⁷ Some of the more controversial suggestions are the extension of CSBMs to naval activities, internal security forces, and defence conversion.