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What more can be done to enhance the NPT's commitment to horizontal non-proliferation, given the lack of specific provisions in the Treaty to ensure enforcement? Above all, this depends on the good intentions of the state parties. But there is room for more confidence-building measures. Fuller explanations should be given when questions are raised about compliance with the NPT. State parties should refrain from any action or statement that might bring into question their commitments to non-proliferation and should take actions to clarify and restore confidence when accusations have been made. One such method is to invite the IAEA to conduct specific inspections when special uncertainties arise... Enhancing the credibility of compliance with the NPT can help lower levels of suspicion and raise the security of concerned states. With respect to transactions of items not under safeguards that might nonetheless be useful in nuclear explosive programs, greater transparency and openness by recipients, as well as vigilance by suppliers, should be encouraged. Canada has a suggestion on tritium in this regard.

With respect to Article III, the obligation to conclude an INFCIRC 153-type safeguards agreement within 18 months of NPT adherence is clear. All NPT par-

ties should make every effort to respect this obligation. We have a special concern in this regard, however, that North Korea, a party with considerable nuclear activity, has not yet concluded its safeguards agreement. This is a particularly clear example of non-compliance which we hope can be resolved soon.

Finding ways to improve the credibility of compliance of all state parties with the NPT is the responsibility of all participants in the Review Conference. Canada hopes this matter can be examined in some greater detail in the weeks ahead.

A basic premise of the NPT is to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As addressed in Article IV, nothing in the NPT is to affect the right of parties to develop peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination — provided this is done in accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. NPT parties are called on to participate in nuclear exchanges of equipment, materials and information "with due consideration for the needs of the developing world." One of the purposes of this Review is to determine to what extent the goals of Article IV have been fulfilled, and the constraints — financial, political or technical — that may impede peaceful inter-

national nuclear cooperation under this article.

It is self-evident to a nuclear-supplier country like Canada that, without the confidence-building, non-proliferation basis of the NPT, there would be much less peaceful international nuclear commerce than is the case now. The NPT provides an essential assurance that such commerce will not contribute to the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Without the NPT, international access to and provision of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes could be greatly reduced.

In the assessment of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the role of Article IV, we are fortunate to have at our disposal the extensive IAEA background paper which summarizes the varied peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in many cases their particular applicability in developing countries. Certainly, there is room for greater efforts to make nuclear technology more available to developing countries — and we would expect this Review Conference to make some recommendations in this regard.

But we must recognize that despite some of the advantages of nuclear energy, including its contribution to sustainable development, it will take some time yet for significant nuclear industry to emerge in most countries. Acquiring nuclear power capability is a particularly daunting challenge to developing countries for financial and technical reasons. It is a view shared by Canada, however, that a series of environmental, economic and energy-related factors may ultimately cause an increase in demand for nuclear power; if and when that occurs, the NPT in general and Article IV in particular will help to promote and facilitate this development.

In the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, extensive international cooperation takes place through the IAEA. Of particular importance for the implementation of Article IV, is the fact that the vast majority of disbursements (about 80%) from the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund