

and understand the details of the case which he is preparing for trial—I myself would put next in the armoury of the advocate the power to select out of this vast mass of detail the things that really matter, and the courage to reject, in the face of his client's reiterated desires, in the face of every other temptation, the accumulation of unnecessary material, which is better left undealt with. The Tichborne litigation was of enormous length and there may have been good reasons why it lasted so long but in my judgment and so far as my own experience goes, other things being equal, the shortest argument is the best.

I have heard advocates say that it is always necessary to repeat an argument at least three times, especially if you are addressing a tribunal which consists of more than one judge. (Laughter.) You have to repeat it for the first time in order that one judge may understand it; you have to repeat it for the second time in order that he may explain it, while you are repeating it, to his brethren (laughter.); and you have to repeat it for the third time in order to correct the erroneous impression which he has unfortunately conveyed. (Loud laughter and applause.) Sir James Aikins, this is a meeting of the Canadian bar. (Laughter.) The judges are here only by sufferance, and I am speaking not of the duty of a judge—it is a thing of which I know nothing at all—but on the wholly different subject of the vocation of an advocate and it is selecting out of a great mass of matter of that which is really important which is really going to tell, which is really going to carry the day. It is a thing which requires sureness of judgment, and it requires strength of character. The lay client is so familiar with his own case that he sometimes finds it very difficult to communicate all the relevant facts of the case to his professional adviser, but on the other hand it is extraordinarily difficult for the lay client to believe that his professional adviser, if he omits any fact in the case, is not doing so either from ignorance or from indolence, or from indifference, or, it may be, from a desire to get as soon as possible into another court. And yet, recalling after an experience of twenty years the arguments that have really impressed me—both arguments in point of law and arguments on questions of fact—I feel more convinced to-day than ever