

missiles; the third for a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; and the fourth for a gradual limitation of military budgets.

These proposals are found, in a different form, in the final document approved by the United Nations General Assembly. On the whole, the Canadian document indicated a desire to be realistic. It was based on many intra-, inter- and para-departmental consultations. It was a document prepared with the greatest care, reflecting a variety of opinions. Significantly, Prime Minister Trudeau was undeniably one of the five most respected speakers at the United Nations. This is testimony both to the Prime Minister's personality and to Canada's prestige in the United Nations. Could this effort have been improved upon, been more original? Did France, for example, not submit more incisive and more innovative proposals - specifically, the proposal for an international satellite agency?

In fact, this latter proposal was seen by all to be premature.

Disarmament or disaster

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makers - sometimes eloquently and occasionally wittily. Their combined message was simply that the arms race must go.

- The *attitudes* of the representatives. Generally good-natured, they avoided acrimony for the most part, despite the existence of strong regional conflicts and animosities. Many of the representatives appeared to be very hard-working, as did the members of UN Secretariat. The procedural role played by some (notably Ambassadors De Rosas and Garcis Robles) was often brilliant.

- The *universality* of the session. Though some populations were not represented, e.g. the people of South Africa, the special session, from the first meetings of its preparatory committee, was truly "the largest, most representative disarmament gathering ever convened".

- Adoption of the *Final Document*. The agreements on a Declaration of Principles, Program of Action and

Nevertheless, France had an attentive audience, especially following the acceptance, after amendments and the presentation of counter-proposals by Britain, of its proposal to broaden the base of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (which will be replaced by the new Disarmament Committee) and to do away with the U.S.-Soviet co-chairmanship.

Although the consultation in Canada was carried out on a national scale, one wonders if Canada might have been able to make more forceful proposals by consulting its allies, the neutral powers and many Third World countries more closely. This question remains unanswered. It could no doubt be the subject of more extensive studies, for the processes of formulating major international policies must be taken beyond our national borders. Perhaps it is because in the past some believed that Canada's calling was an international one that it is now approaching a new crossroads. ■

New Machinery and a continuing process for governments, non-governmental organizations and the UN, are a great accomplishment, which should be the basis for action at all levels in the months and years ahead.

Acceptance of NGOs and the need for disarmament research and education. The acceptance by the UN of an important role for NGOs - during the preparatory meetings, the special session and the months ahead - was reflected by proposals in the Final Document for mobilizing world public opinion by means of disarmament research, training and education.

There were, however, discouraging aspects. These included the following five points:

- No *breakthrough* achieved either in nuclear or conventional disarmament. Nor was there any sign that such a breakthrough was on the horizon: the arms race continues and increases in scope and tempo.

- The *inadequate processes* available to the special session for

generating anything resembling a breakthrough. The necessity of "receiving instructions from home", or following the general rules of the General Assembly, of accommodating a very large body of people without adequate management, planning and steering mechanisms, all militated against major accomplishments.

- The *rigidity* reflected in the views of many representatives, particularly those of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China, concerning the causes of the arms race. Great difficulty was experienced by representatives in admitting national error or guilt. Almost all delegations demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to give away anything very substantial in the bargaining sessions. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. had most to give and yet offered least. In consequence, they continue to bear most responsibility for the continuing arms race - but all of us, in our insistence on "modernization", contribute to that process.

- Poor coverage by the world's *media* and little clamour by people generally for greater coverage of the six weeks. The almost complete absence of women speakers (one out of 120) was also noticeable.

- The *world's climate* was not conducive to a successful special session in the early summer of 1978. Huge build-ups by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact (or *vice versa*), the absence of the heads of government of the "Big Two" and the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa all made the task of the special session extremely difficult.

Once again on the positive side, however, are the final document's suggestions for follow-up by governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. These include:

- studies of disarmament and development (Paragraphs 92 and 93):

- study of disarmament and international security (Paragraph 95):

- disarmament education and peace studies, especially publicity for the final document (Paragraphs 98, 99 and 104):

- Disarmament Week, 24-30 October (Paragraph 100): initiatives by the UN Educational,