

He says that there were great differences between the regiments, "some comparing very favourably with the best of the militia of England, others in the matter of training to the very worst". At the same time he bears generous testimony to the magnitude of the difficulties and the energy with which in many cases they have been overcome. One remark of his deserves great attention, and is especially applicable to our own volunteers. He says that there is in many cases an utter ignorance of the existence of the most obvious faults. The conclusion to which he is led by this fact is that there should be some pattern to which all regiments might conform. Without such a pattern he thinks that gradual deterioration is inevitable. As long as there were a few Imperial regiments in Canada the required standard and pattern of efficiency were furnished, but now that there is only one small garrison, at Halifax, the regiments of the militia can only compare themselves with each other. Another advantage derived from the presence of regular corps was, that they provided officers and men for conducting the instruction at the schools of instruction. As a practical substitute for Imperial regiments Colonel Fletcher suggests that permanent skeleton corps should be instituted to serve as a nucleus, a standard of efficiency, and as schools of instruction. In answer to those who urge that in case of war the mother country would send out a supply of officers for the service with the Canadian militia, he sensibly observes that England would want for her own army all the officers she could lay hold of. He proposes, therefore, that a third school of instruction—two are already in existence—should be established, and that each should be the military head quarters of a third of the Dominion. At each school he recommends the maintenance of a force of a battery of artillery of 250 men and 48 horses—only two guns being horsed—a half troop of cavalry of forty men and thirty horses, a few engineers, and a battalion of infantry of three companies and 240 men. At these schools the non-commissioned officers and men should be enlisted for one year, to be re-engaged, if found efficient, for another five years. These men, Colonel Fletcher proposes, should be trained as non-commissioned officers, and should serve as such with regiments of active militia when the latter are called out for training, or in time of war. The officers should be selected men, and all young gentlemen aspiring to commissions should be required to attend for six months. The advantage of this scheme is that it would only be a development of, not a radical change in, existing institutions, for two classes on a small scale already exist and there is also a permanent battery, which serves both as a school and a nucleus of a standing army. The cost of the militia would, if Colonel Fletcher's views were carried out, only slightly exceed the sum voted in 1872, for he proposes that the active militia should be reduced from 43,000 paper to 34,000 effective men. He would, moreover, only assemble in camp 25,000 men, deeming it better to have a few highly than many imperfectly trained men. It might, perhaps be as well if at home we were to deal with the question of military organization and administration in a similar way. For instance, we should decide how much money we can afford for military purposes, how much would probably attain our object under any circumstances, and then cut our coat according to our cloth, instead of reversing the process as we do now. It is very certain that we might with advantage diminish the number of our volunteer and militia by

at least one third, provided the money thus saved were expended on rolls. We are however, rather foolish in that respect, and will not vote large estimates unless they are for a large body of men. The idea may not find favour with the public, but we do not hesitate to say that the country would be infinitely stronger that it is at present if, for the present auxiliary army, without organization, staff, and camp equipage—the volunteers without even great coats—a force of 200,000 men, efficiently trained and provided and organized for war, were substituted. Mere numbers are rather an incumbrance to a general than otherwise, for the military strength of a nation is to be measured not by the number of men on the rolls, but by the number of men who can within a reasonable time be placed on the theatre of war in a state which shall enable them to march and fight as directed.

To return from this digression, we come to the comparative military strength of Canada and the United States. Many people laugh to scorn the idea of Canada being able for a moment to resist her powerful neighbour. The idea is not, however, so wild as it might seem. The regular army of America does not exceed 30,000 men, scattered for the most part on the Indian frontier; whilst the great civil war, the militia and volunteers, which constituted on either side the vast majority of the army, have received but little training. At first, therefore, Canada would have the advantage, for she could in the course of a week place 30,000 men thoroughly organized and fairly trained on the frontier, while in rear of these, and available for immediate service, is the reserve militia, numbering more than 650,000 men, a large number of whom have passed through the active militia. Up to three or four hundred thousand men Canada could, no doubt, on its frontier, meet the foe on more than equal terms, and it would probably be many months, if not a year or two, before America could bring to the front a larger force. What, however, may fairly be expected from Canada is such an organization as should enable her to keep the Americans in check till aid could arrive from England. More than this we have no right to require. — *London Standard*, Feb. 18th.

REVIEWS.

We are indebted to the courtesy of T. D. SULLIVAN, Esq., late 56th Regt., Assistant Secretary, &c. of the Royal United Service Institution, for copies of the following pamphlets. — "The Organization of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers Explained," by THOS. BRASSEY, M.P. "The Ashantee war of 1863, by Capt. KNAPP BARROW, h. p., 27th Inniskilling Regt., and Military Secretary to the Officer Commanding on the Gold Coast." "Note upon Recent Experiments with the Vavasseur Rib Rifled Gun and the Woolwich Steel Gun, carried out by the Bourges Commission." As affecting the question of Rifled Artillery the latter is of considerable importance, and we shall probably give our readers extracts from it. The experiments were carried out most minutely, and the results show that the true system for rifled Artillery has yet to be discovered.

We have to acknowledge the receipt of the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. The present No. LXXV of the 17th Volume contains the following articles. — "The Eastern Cause as an I. Daghistan", "The Edu-

cation and Professional Instruction of Officers" "The Game of Naval Tactics"; "Extracts from a Report on Orange Walk"; "New River as a military position for the protection of British interests in Honduras"; "The Voyage of H. M. S. *Challenger*"; "Extracts from a paper read at the British Association for the advancement of Science"; "A proposed method of mounting heavy Ordnance at Sea on the principle of Bessemer's Locomotive Apparatus for automatically recording the rolling of a ship in a sea way"; "On the accurate firing of Naval Ordnance by means of the vessels motion"; "Experience in Savage Warfare"; "British troops and Savage Warfare with special reference to the Kafir Wars."

And also the following "Lectures addressed to Officers of Volunteer corps" at the Royal United Service Institution:—"Change of Tactics consequent on the improvement of weapons and other circumstances"; "Mounted Riflemen"; "Notes on Maps"; "On Disembarkations"; "The recent war with reference to the Militia and Volunteers"; "On the connection between the ordinary work of soldiers in peace time and warlike efficiency."

We have received from Messrs Durie and Sons the Leonard Scott Publishing Co.'s reprint of the *London Quarterly Review* for January.

No less than three biographical sketches arrest the attention as we turn over the pages. Winkelmann's History of Ancient Art has long been a standard authority; but few have known the career of the author, as given in the pages of this review—painful in its outset, tragical at its close. In a review of "The Personal Recollections" of Mrs Somerville, we have the outline of another life, one of repose and peace, contrasting strongly with the troubled story of the other. The little Scotch lassie, whose parents thought one year's schooling when she was ten years old would fit her for her work in life, had a love for study which could not be repressed by the great discouragements which attended her early years. It has been well remarked, "We shall never certainly know, although it may be that hereafter we shall be able to guess, what Science lost through the all but utter neglect of the unusual powers of her mind." No department of mathematical research was beyond her powers. It is unnecessary to recapitulate Mrs Somerville's works; they are too well known. We content ourselves with a glimpse at the writer. "Her head was rather smaller than those of other women of her moderate height, and the impression which its form conveyed was that of extreme delicacy of feeling, and elevation of character rather than of power. Head, countenance, figure, manners, all were in perfect harmony with the gentle, intelligent, well bred lady, who talked so pleasantly in society, painted such pretty pictures, touched the piano with such taste, and worked such lovely embroidery."

John Stuart Mill is the subject of another biographical article, in which the development of his mind is illustrated by reference to the works produced at the different stages of his career.

Other articles are "Simplification of the Law," "Sacerdotalism, Ancient and Modern," treating on the history and growth of Protestant conversions, and other religious observances; "Lombard Street," showing the importance of the Cash Reserve of the banking department of the Bank of England, as the ultimate safety fund of the English mercantile system; "The Despot-