

such evidence. The best we can do is stall for time in the hopes that the SVM will eventually be able to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the Commission.

J. GREY

757.

DEA/50052-A-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3371

Washington, November 3, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tel Y-598 Nov 1.

Repeat for Information: London (OpImmediate), NATO Paris, Paris, Laosdel Geneva (Priority), Delhi, Saigon (OpImmediate) from Ottawa, CCOS Ottawa, DGPO, CGS, DND Ottawa from Ottawa.

By Bag Moscow, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Warsaw, Hanoi from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

At 5:30 November 2 I saw Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to carry out the instructions in your reference telegram. By that time we had received Saigon's telegram 209 November 1† reporting that South Vietnam Foreign Minister had agreed to write to the Commission on November 1, formally requesting them to consider moving to Hanoi. Johnson informed me that USA Ambassador Nolting had just reported to the same effect by telegram. He also informed me that the State Department on November 1 had sent instructions to Nolting to make strong representations to the South Vietnam to stop its harassment of the Polish Delegation, which the State Department regarded such a policy as unwise at any time, and particularly at the present juncture. Johnson indicated that Nolting had received these instructions after learning of the proposed letter from the South Vietnam Foreign Minister to the Commission, but that Nolting would nevertheless carry them out. Johnson warned us that, as he was sure we were aware, the South Vietnam Government was not repeat not always "responsive" to USA views.

2. Despite these developments I registered the views in your Y-598 for the record and obtained Johnson's explicit and unqualified assurance that:

(a) the State Department continued to be of opinion that, in the general interest, the Commission should remain in Vietnam;

(b) the State Department accordingly considered that the South Vietnam should be persuaded to reverse its present attitude toward the Commission; and

(c) the State Department was exercising every effort in this direction.

3. Our discussion was hampered by the fact that the South Vietnam Foreign Minister had now, as we had just learned, taken formal action to request the Commission to move to Hanoi. Johnson did, however, agree that he would review the instructions sent to Nolting to see whether further instructions were desirable in the light of the Canadian views that had been presented to him and of the new development in Saigon. Although necessarily on speculative ground, we agreed that it seemed desirable as intimated in Saigon's telegram 209, to play for time whilst efforts were being made to persuade the GRVN to relax pressure against the Poles.