

65.

DEA/50271-M-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
à la délégation au Comité sur le désarmement*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Delegation to Disarmament Committee*

TELEGRAM N-28

Ottawa, February 27, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tel No. 55 Feb 26.

DISARMAMENT: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

Following for General Burns:

Secretary of State for External Affairs was concerned to note from your conversations with Godber and Foster (your reference telegram) that UK and USA delegations are satisfied for the time being simply to await further developments in the Soviet position on the above subject. The Minister was also disturbed at any suggestion that Foster might leave Geneva at this critical time.

2. Secretary of State for External Affairs wishes you to reiterate to Godber and Foster the overriding need at this time for a concrete demonstration of their determination to resolve outstanding differences on key problems of inspection, particularly numbers of on-site inspections. They should be left in no doubt that in our view the time factor is of extreme importance, and that any further delay would greatly endanger the future work of the ENDC and give rise to other consequences outlined in paragraph 4 of our telegram N-26 of February 25.

3. Secretary of State for External Affairs assumes you will also be in touch with other non-aligned delegations in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 4 of your reference telegram.

[N.A.] ROBERTSON

66.

DEA/50271-M-40

*Le conseiller du Gouvernement canadien en matière du désarmement
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Advisor to Government of Canada on Disarmament
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 60

Geneva, March 1, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tels N28 Feb 27 and N26 Feb 25.

DISARMAMENT: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

As instructed in your reference telegrams I put to Mr. Foster the views and considerations set forth in them. He said USA authorities appreciated that agreement on a nuclear test ban was important both intrinsically and as a symbol of progress towards disarmament. This was the reason for the continued USA flexibility. The Administration had gone beyond the point where they could be assured of the Senate's support for a treaty based on their position. Foster thought the Senate could hardly accept further concessions on the USA side. It is essential that