plaintiff erected on property adjoining the defendant's a conservatory with a glazed roof sloping to the vertical side of the conservatory which stood on the boundary line between the plaintiff's and defendant's properties. This vertical side was glazed, and the plaintiff at the time of the erection agreed in writing to pay the defendant 1 s. a year as "acknowledgement for allowing the windows in my conservatory adjoining to open on to and overlook" the defendant's property. The annual payments under this agreement were made down to 1888, when the conservatory was converted into a passage and the glazed side was bricked up, leaving a glazed roof for the passage. In 1901 the defendant built a wall on his land which obstructed the access of light to the roof of the passage, and it was to restrain this alleged interference with the plaintiff's light that the action was brought, and the question was whether the skylight was a window "overlooking" the defendant's property within the meaning of the agreement of 1873. Both Joyce, J., and the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling, and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) were agreed that it was, and therefore that the light had been enjoyed by "consent or agreement" up to 1888, and consequently the plaintiff had acquired no prescriptive right to the easement he claimed.

PRACTICE—ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF SEVERAL PATENTS—SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION COMBINED—CONFINING CLAIM TO ONE OR MORE CAUSES—PLEADING—EMBARRASSMENT—APPEAL, FURTHER EVIDENCE ON—RULES 188, 195, 196, 223—(ONT. RULES 232, 237, 248.)

In *Saccharin Corporation* v. *Wild*, (1903) 1 Ch. 410, the plaintiff company sued to recover damages for the alleged infringement of twenty-three different patents of inventions. In the particulars of the plaintiffs' claim the plaintiffs stated generally that the defendant had infringed "all" the patents, but alleged only two specific cases of infringement. The defendant applied for further and better particulars, or that the action might be limited to such of the patents as might seem just, and Kekewich, J., ordered the application to stand over until the statement of defence had been delivered. On Appeal, however, the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Stirling, and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) held that the defendant's application ought to succeed, as it was unfair to the defendant to embrace so many causes of action in one, and the plaintiffs were ordered to confine the case to such three of the