

of their descent. A part of that House it is true were nominated by the Crown, namely, the spiritual peers, but as these held their seats by virtue of their holding certain ecclesiastical positions, it might be fairly said that no portion of the House of Lords were nominated directly to their legislative positions by the Crown. Then the members of this body received a special, social and educational training for their bright positions, as they knew from their earliest youth that they would in time be called to take their seats in the House of Lords. The same could not be said of our Senators. They went through the same political and party training as did members of the Commons, and that training was not of a kind to make them independent, either of the government of the day or of the gusts of popular feeling. In fact, the appointments to the Senate were exactly of the same class as the appointments to any other salaried position in the gift of the Government. They were rewards of party zeal, or of the influence which the persons receiving the appointments may have exercised or will be able to exercise on behalf of the Government of the day, and the same kind of evils which were connected with the system of making appointments to the civil service for political considerations existed with reference to appointments to the Senate, though in a much greater degree, as the position was higher and the duties more important. If he might be allowed to give his own opinion of what position the Senate should fill under the Federal system, it would be that that body should not only be a check on hasty legislation, but should be a mediator between the various Provinces and between the provinces and the federal power. In order that it might be a check upon hasty legislation, it might be sufficient if its members were elected for a longer term than the members of the Commons; but in order that it should be in a position to act as mediator between the Provinces, it should be the representatives of the different Provinces and not of constituencies. Senators nominated by the Government of the day were not necessarily representatives of their Provinces, but might, on the contrary, be entirely opposed to the prevailing sentiment in their Provinces. On the whole, he approved of the plan suggested by the mover of the resolution for

which he would cast his vote. Referring to the case cited by the member for St. John, in which the Senate had defeated a Bill sent up by the Lower House, namely, the Tuckersmith Bill, he thought the hon. gentleman had selected a most unfortunate illustration, because, if there was any subject upon which the Commons might be supposed to have full control it was one which related to its own constitution.

Mr. MACDOUGALL (East Elgin), approved of having a Second Chamber, but thought that some better mode than the present should be devised for constituting it. His idea of the functions of the Senate were those of a revising body, as a sort of appellant body, where questions could be decided in a judicial spirit. Then with reference to those who should be called on to perform those functions, they should be men of large experience and great learning, and men who were familiar with the principles of constitutional Government. The next question was how were these men to be selected. He proceeded to discuss the different modes suggested, namely, the nominative system, the elective system, and the system of election by the Local Legislatures, and pointed out the advantages of the latter system. We had a right to ask the Imperial Parliament to revise our Constitution, the Imperial Parliament being the highest authority to which we could appeal. There was nothing in the proposition of the hon. member for Bothwell which was contrary to responsible government, as understood under the principles of the British Constitution. The allegation that any change made in the Constitution was revolutionary fell to the ground, because he found that such changes were often made in England. Although the framers of our constitution had determined the Senate would be nominated by the Crown, it afforded no reason why, if further experience and knowledge obtained since that time satisfied us that a change was required, that change should be made. It would be a very dangerous principle to adopt in legislation, if as soon as an Act of Parliament was passed adopting a certain principle, no change could be made, however much it was required. He believed there was a growing feeling prevailing in the country that a change was necessary in the