

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: I do not know whether I can be much more specific than I was in that broadcast but what I did say at that time on this point was this—and I had better read it before I start explaining it or trying to explain it. I said that our objectives in Korea were the defeat of aggression and victory against the aggressor. I then went on and I quote: “but victory in this type of limited United Nations war may not have to be the kind of complete capitulation of the enemy with which we have been made familiar. Victory is the achievement of our objectives, and they remain the defeat of aggression against the republic of Korea.” That is from my broadcast and that is what you would like to have explained in more detail?

Mr. Low: Yes.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: What I meant by that was that I did not feel that we were under any obligation by virtue of any resolution of the United Nations—which is still the only source of our obligations in Korea—to conduct a war through to a victorious conclusion, in the sense that victory must mean the defeat of the Chinese government in China.

It is true that this government, through its troops, is intervening in the aggression in Korea, but our objective is to defeat that aggression and if that can be done by limited action with limited objectives then I think we will have discharged our obligations under the United Nations resolution.

Now, in recent days—as late as yesterday in the hearing before the Senate committee, General Vandenberg indicated that the aggression might be defeated if the north Korean and Chinese aggressors were driven back beyond the thirty-eighth parallel and ceased their efforts to attack. I can visualize a situation where the actual aggression might be defeated by a Chinese and north Korean withdrawal behind that line—as an indication of a willingness that they meant to negotiate.

The aggression began when they broke through the thirty-eighth parallel; the aggression might conceivably be ended when they agreed to keep behind it again and to negotiate a political settlement which would bring about the unification and liberation of all Korea by political means.

Mr. DICKEY: Our objective would be the unification and liberation of Korea?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: Our political objectives, in the Statement of Principles are, first, a cease fire, to be followed by a political settlement which would make it possible for a united and liberated Korea to be set up by a decision of the Korean people themselves.

Mr. COLDWELL: My interpretation of what you said now I think would be correct—that you had in mind the liberation of the Republic of Korea, which would mean that beyond the thirty-eighth parallel we were not interested in military activities—although we are interested in a political settlement for all Korea.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: I would not go so far as that because it may well be that in order to maintain our position in south Korea and restore the republic of Korea it may be necessary to destroy military elements of the aggressor north of the thirty-eighth parallel. It would depend upon the military position, the situation, or what the Americans call the “military posture of the aggressor”. If he moved well back and de facto cease fire resulted, that would be one situation. The fact that he moved back beyond the thirty-eighth parallel to regroup, refit, and reorganize with a view to another attack might mean that it would be necessary to attack him there.

Mr. Low: The reason that I brought up the question is that I think you can see, as I mentioned in the debate on External Affairs, the possibility of the United Nations suffering considerable loss of prestige as a result of what may be