

special consideration (and assistance) within a framework of freer global trade. As M. Jean-Luc Pepin has pointed out, "the erosion of basic trading rules through discriminatory arrangements could only benefit the strong rather than the weak". (107)

### 3. Immigration and the Brain Drain

(i) The 1967 changes in Canadian immigration policy and the principles of non-discrimination and universality have resulted in a significant shift of immigration patterns with substantial increases in the intake from developing countries. However, immigration to Canada cannot provide more than a minor measure of relief to population pressure and then only in some developing countries. (109-110)

(ii) The primacy of skill-criteria in selecting immigrants from developing countries has sometimes induced a "brain drain" effect which can set back development prospects. The present Canadian policy is not to solicit immigration in developing countries, but to offer the usual facilities to those who apply and it is difficult for Canada without discrimination to impose new restrictions on the present flow. (111-112)

(iii) Some other possibilities might be considered, including: increased "third-country" training to discourage student emigration; recruitment of expatriates to return and work in their home countries; and temporary assignments for surplus personnel in other developing countries. Beyond these rather limited suggestions, the Subcommittee considers that the onus of responsibility for limiting the emigration of skilled manpower from developing countries must rest with their governments. (113-116)

### 4. The Administrative Structure

(i) The need for greater consistency and improved coordination of Canada's overall aid effort cannot be brought about by any simple administrative or hierarchical reorganization. What is needed is continuing political commitment to ascribing a high priority to all aspects of international development assistance. In combination with this impetus, a number of structural changes may prove beneficial. (117-118)

(ii) The Subcommittee considered suggestions that CIDA be raised to the status of a full ministry, or be given increased autonomy as a Crown Corporation. The Subcommittee concurred with the judgment of Mr. Maurice Strong that, under present circumstances, CIDA operates under "a pretty workable arrangement". (119-120)

(iii) Looking to future possibilities, the Subcommittee concluded that the crown corporation structure would be unlikely to enhance the stature or effectiveness of the aid agency, and would sacrifice an important element of accountability. A separate ministry for international development would be desirable if it could be assured the standing of a senior department—but the Subcommittee does not now believe this would be the case. In the future the Agency may grow to the

point where separate, yet prominent, representation in the cabinet will be both practicable and necessary. (119-123, 125, 126)

(iv) Under present conditions the appointment of a junior minister at the level of Minister of State, subordinate to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and without a seat in the Cabinet, might strengthen CIDA's voice at the political level in Canada and abroad. (124)

(v) While the Subcommittee has found the present structural arrangements for CIDA to be generally satisfactory, it considers some of the former President's arguments for "a greater degree of operating flexibility" to be quite convincing. As he said, this should be possible, in view of CIDA's peculiar needs and circumstances, "without sacrificing any of the essential principles of government control and effectiveness". (122, 127)

(vi) CIDA's overseas operations will presumably be fundamentally affected by the trend toward integration of Canada's foreign services. In countries where Canada's official relations primarily involve development cooperation, it is desirable to continue and extend the present practice of giving CIDA personnel and other officials with experience in development assistance senior responsibilities. It is also important that these missions have channels of easy and direct communication with the responsible agencies and departments in Canada. (128)

(vii) The de-centralization of CIDA's decision-making authority to personnel operating in recipient countries could reduce the delay between allocations and disbursements of funds. This would require permitting officers in the field to approve small projects. (129)

(viii) The Canadian International Development Board and other interdepartmental committees at lower levels should meet frequently and regularly. The CIDA representatives, in particular, should act as a major source of proposals for interdepartmental consideration which naturally will have to be well-supported if they are to gain support. (130)

### B. Activities of Non-Governmental Organizations

(i) Although official development assistance is a relatively new phenomenon, the social development and technical assistance activities of churches and other non-governmental organizations have a long and impressive history. In Canada, the voluntary sector, involving about 150 organizations and more than 8500 overseas personnel, now provides assistance valued at about \$40 million per year. (131, 133)

(ii) These non-official channels of development cooperation have a number of important advantages, and in many respects, tend to reinforce and complement official aid programmes. (132, 134)

(iii) Official support, through CIDA's Special Programs Division, of the development activities of non-governmental organizations is administered on a "matching grant" basis. This programme is expanding very rapidly. The Subcommittee recognizes the basic validity of the "matching grant system" but recommends that it