

of a new world, political and economic, and one based on friendly co-operation between all the nations which composed it. We in Canada hoped that our own economic well-being and the national security of our country would be assured through the extension into peacetime of the international co-operation of the war. We have had to admit quite frankly, however, that in present circumstances the organization which we created for this purpose in the United Nations, is not equal to this task.

Unhappily the basic requirements for the full success of the United Nations did not carry over from war to peace. The unity of the Great Powers, upon which so much depended, was soon eaten away by the acids of post-war controversy. At the war's end, a dozen or more great and contentious political issues rose from the political confusion of Western Europe and Eastern Asia. Basically, these problems could all be reduced to one great question. How far would the Soviet Union go in exploiting the post-war situation so as to extend its territory and increase its might? This question was no idle speculation. We had seen the boundaries of Russia extended first in 1939 and 1940 at the expense of Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia and Finland. As the war went on, it became clear that the promise of freedom to Poland would not include these eastern Polish provinces, which were, in fact, eventually surrendered by Poland to the U.S.S.R. After the war's end, parts of Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were also added. By 1945 the boundaries of the Soviet Union had been pushed further to the west than ever before in Russian history.

Not content with this expansion, the U.S.S.R. then proceeded to surround itself with a group of satellite governments, imposing its will upon neighbouring peoples through the local communist parties supported by Russian troops. The list alone of these captive regimes is evidence of the coercion which created them. Who could believe that the Poles, a people that for centuries, with courage and resolve, had fought against all comers for their freedom, would submit of their own free will to Soviet control? For a hundred years, the insistent demand for freedom of the Hungarians, the Roumanians, the Bulgars, the Czechs, and the Slovaks, has been one of the strongest forces in European politics. Only when it has been suppressed by ruthless physical superiority has this force lain dormant. Indeed, we already see in Yugoslavia a sign that the peoples in Eastern Europe find the yoke that has been laid upon them heavy and degrading. The one border territory which has managed to maintain its independence is Finland, but even there the long and menacing hand of Moscow threatens dire punishment if the slightest Soviet interest seems to be in danger, real or imaginary.

The tight control which the U.S.S.R. has established by these oppressive means in Eastern Europe has been given a false facade of international respectability by treaty arrangements. The Soviet government has been charging that the Atlantic Pact is an offensive threat aimed at them. But they themselves had no hesitation in initiating and negotiating -- if the word negotiation can be used to describe their methods -- treaty arrangements in Eastern Europe for their own security, long before the Atlantic Treaty was even considered; and before the United Nations had demonstrated its weakness as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. We are not sure how many treaties and agreements there are amongst the communist states of Eastern Europe, because, in spite of the terms of the Charter, only a few of them have been registered with the United Nations. So far as we can tell, however, there are over fifty treaties and agreements amongst the group of communist states comprising the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Bulgaria. These are variously termed treaties for friendship and mutual assistance; co-operation and mutual assistance; collaboration and mutual aid; economic collaboration and reciprocal delivery of goods, trade and payments. Their total effect, however, is to spread a thick net of political and economic commitment over the areas under the domination of the Soviet Union.

In the presence of the problems created by Soviet expansion, what could we expect of an international organization like the United Nations, which was based on the assumed unanimity of the great powers? How could there be any