

3. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-armed forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

Taken together, these changes to the 1999 Strategic Concept would fundamentally alter the character of the nuclear policy of the Alliance, removing it from its present central position and reinforcing the commitment to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. (The complete texts of the proposed revisions to the relevant sections are appended to this report.)

PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While most of the measures reviewed in this report would contribute to the nuclear disarmament agenda, not all are equally important, nor do all fit equally well with Canada's place and comparative advantages. The report therefore concludes with recommendations for which measures should be emphasised in Canadian policy. Before turning to these recommendations, I provide a brief summary of the relations among and priorities within the nuclear confidence and security building measures reviewed above.