

regions or tasks. Criteria would have to be developed as to who they could have on their teams, how they would have been trained in advance (ostensibly in part by the Centre), how fast they would be expected to deploy, how they would report to a UN human rights headquarters, and as a cautionary measure their prior agreement to leave the operation and the country immediately upon being requested to do so.

5.4 Conclusion

Apart from occasional glimmers, the UN human rights structures failed in the lead up to, and immediately after, April 6th. Subsequently their interventions have been unfocussed and largely ineffectual to date. Perhaps more unsettling is the feeling that some key UN human rights decision makers have not realised what they should have done, and thus are not actively looking for lessons to be learned. This has extremely negative implications for the next human rights 'Rwanda'.

In particular, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights have substantial potential to influence the UN's crisis response. Going even further, by definition they are the core of the UN human rights system. They have a duty to play a larger and much more independent role as the UN's human rights conscience.