

are subject to differing levels of verification. Determining which chemicals belonged on which schedule required agreement among qualified chemical engineers from participating parties; even so, the chemical precursors listed by the Australia Group fall in several different schedules in the CWC, and some are not included at all.

Article VIII of the CWC established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to administer the treaty. The OPCW, in turn, comprises three segments. The Conference of the States Parties is the principal organ of the OPCW; it can take decisions on any questions raised by any of the parties. The Executive Council is the executive organ responsible for overseeing implementation and operation of the convention; it also is directed to consider compliance concerns and "cases of non-compliance." The Technical Secretariat is responsible for carrying out all the details of implementing and verifying the convention; it is responsible for negotiating arrangements for how inspections in each state will be conducted. Bringing OPCW and all of its subsidiary units into efficient operation by January 1995 is no small task. This was recognized and an OPCW Preparatory Commission has been meeting regularly to accomplish this purpose. When fully operational, OPCW could have a headquarters staff of about 800 people working in The Hague. Balancing the points of view represented by the countries from which these people come, reaching agreement on allocation of budgetary resources, and facing the responsibilities associated with dealing with ambiguous situations and clear cases of non-compliance will require diplomacy and patience exceeding that required to achieve the convention itself.

Normally, the criterion of determining effective verification is military significance. However, what constitutes military significance in a multilateral or regional context is quite different from that in the old bilateral world. Each party to a multilateral agreement will have its own view of what constitutes military significance and effective verification. It is partly

for this reason that the CWC verification regime is so detailed and comprehensive. Because of the relative ease with which a state can develop, produce and stockpile chemical weapons, and the difficulty of detecting such an activity, on-site inspections play an especially important role in the CWC verification regime. Of particular note are the "challenge inspections" which authorize any party to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location if it suspects possible cheating. However, because of the necessity to protect sensitive installations and information, the inspected state can use "managed access" techniques to protect sensitive information. While challenge inspections appear to permit access to any facility or activity, the "managed access" technique can prohibit complete access; thus, there may remain a question of full compliance. That being the case, some may question whether challenge inspections are worth the "cost"—in all senses of the term.

The CWC establishes a verification regime that imposes unprecedented demands on private industry. Thousands of industrial companies around the world will be affected. Many of these companies have legitimate concerns over the loss of proprietary information on which their business is based, responsibilities for accidents during inspections, and responsibilities for stand-down costs. There will need to be continuing dialogues between the governments and the chemical industries of state parties in order to resolve or minimize the impact of these inspections. The U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association has stressed its commitment to the goal of ridding the world of chemical weapons, while seeking to ensure the CWC is implemented in the most efficient manner.

Aspects of the four issues discussed concerning the CWC should be taken into account in formulating future multilateral regimes. Clear definitions will be a necessity in the negotiation of a CTBT, for example, the definition of a nuclear explosion; avoidance of the definition will create future problems. Discussions of a

