

effective restraint on South African power, any attempt to formulate a security regime will be a "non-starter".

The discussion of power asymmetries in Southern Africa turned to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The question formulated in discussion asked how power imbalances ought to be redressed and whether the military dimension must be central to regime development. A number of other questions arose which highlighted avenues for further research. Do Western countries adequately appreciate the costs to Southern Africa of confrontation in Angola? Does this situation require the West to develop a supportive diplomatic relationship with Cuba, or even supply military support to shore up Angolan (Cuban) ability to resist South African intrusions? If redressing the power imbalances in Southern Africa requires military inputs, should we not consider supplying the SADCC states with the military means to resist South Africa as well?

Citing the West's changed attitude towards the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchia, Dr. Ernie Gilman (Department of National Defence) pointed out that the definition and criteria of legitimacy are situation-specific. In particular, he asked whether legitimacy is a function of the degree of internal popular support. If so, then, by this criterion, the South African Government could be defined as "illegitimate." However, by the same logic, the high degree of popular support for the Nazi Party in Hitler's Germany would define it as "legitimate."

Theoretical Considerations

David Leyton-Brown further developed the discussion by pointing out that the assumption that a security regime does not exist in Southern Africa rests on an assumption regarding the nature of a security regime. Whereas some analysts view a