

immediate cease-fire; the Soviet Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin came and met President Johnson, and the senior deputy foreign minister Vassily Kuznetsov came and changed the top members of the Soviet delegation to the UN for having blundered and given them the wrong cue.

"The Soviets admitted in private more or less that they had made a mistake. 'Now where do we go from here?' they asked. And out of this *mea culpa* act there came, after some more maneuverings, the Soviet acceptance of Resolution 242 in the Security Council. [This resolution, adopted unanimously in November 1967, defined the framework for a peaceful settlement and based it on twin principles: withdrawal of Israeli troops from territory occupied in the recent conflict, coupled with an acknowledgement of the right of all states in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.]

"In a way, the momentum towards Resolution 242 started with our consultations with the Latin American bloc, who saw the strength of the argument which Mike Pearson had originally put forward at Suez in 1956. This was that it was no use demanding that Israel should withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949; what was required was that wherever they withdrew to would be recognized by its neighbours. We renewed that argument with the Latin Americans in 1967 and they said, 'In international law that is the right line.' Starting with the Latin Americans, that view began to spread in the Afro-Asian group. When the Soviets called (under the Uniting for Peace resolution) a special session of the General Assembly, they found to their great surprise that their delegation could not get a clear majority for a simple resolution demanding the withdrawal of Israel to the armistice lines.

"So then the issue bounced back to the Security Council. Lord Caradon was asked to co-ordinate the gathering of sponsors for what became Resolution 242, whose drafting was largely in the hands of the British. But Canada worked on bits and pieces of the resolution, and some of it had been tried out in the Assembly session.

"In the Security Council in 1948, it was a simple game of getting a majority to legitimize an American-led Western decision. Now it is a very sophisticated game of getting any kind of decision. Therefore, the easiest thing is to say, 'If we cannot get a clearcut decision, let's wind up the whole bloody works!' But that makes no sense. First of all, the Council is a constant point of contact between the great powers. Secondly, it gains time for some sensible action. Thirdly, if things get too dangerous between the two sides, you can conceive of a situation—as happened in 1967—when they suddenly reverse their positions and reach common ground, preferably by consensus rather than by vote."