

Moreover, all the other doctrinal and conceptual innovations introduced by Khrushchev were retained by the Brezhnev regime. Soviet spokesmen continued to stress the differentiation of capitalist ruling circles into moderate and hard-line forces, and they reiterated that the emergence of a sober tendency in the West made it possible to establish a stable detente and to achieve meaningful disarmament agreements. The end to capitalist encirclement, the "final" victory of socialism, and the non-inevitability of world war were all taken as given.

Aside from the role played by such factors as Brezhnev's conservative temperament, his desire not to tarnish the Soviet Union's revolutionary image, and his disinterest in ideology, Brezhnev's failure to expand Soviet conceptions of peaceful coexistence, even at the height of detente in 1972-1974, can also be viewed as an implicit tribute to Khrushchev's success in refashioning the Marxist-Leninist worldview. Khrushchev left his successors with a new set of propositions and principles which enabled them to conceptualize in their own minds, and to legitimize in the eyes of their followers, a broad range of co-operative policies toward the capitalist world, ranging from frequent summit meetings and expanded trade to the regulation of regional conflict and arms control. Khrushchev's innovations provided Brezhnev with an ideological carte blanche to pursue his policy of expanded detente. Brezhnev was far more concerned than his predecessor with the potential political costs of ideological innovation, so he chose to avoid a further revision of the Stalinist legacy. In his pursuit of detente, Brezhnev preferred to proceed with concrete measures to expand political and economic co-operation with the West but to avoid calling undue attention to this process by making sweeping ideological pronouncements.

There was, however, an unanticipated cost associated with this strategy. The absence of doctrinal change meant that the Soviet leadership did not stand back and rethink traditional approaches to East-West relations. The adjustments that were made in Soviet policy did not go beyond tactical fine tuning (such as expanding trade with the West and allowing 250,000 Jews to emigrate). Thus,