

excessive military spending and in other ways, contribute to the insecurity of others. I hope that further thought can be given to these ideas before this special session draws to a close.

Impact of suffocation

"A strategy of suffocation seems to me to have a number of advantages. It is not merely declaratory because it will have a real and progressive impact on the development of new strategic weapons systems. It will have that impact in three ways: by freezing the available amount of fissionable material; by preventing any technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested; and by reducing the moneys devoted to military expenditure. It is also a realistic strategy because it assumes that, for some time to come at least, total nuclear disarmament is probably unattainable in practice. It avoids some of the problems encountered in the negotiations currently under way, in that it does not involve complex calculations of balance but leaves the nuclear weapons states some flexibility in adjusting their force levels using existing weapons technology. It has at least the potential of reducing the risks of conflict that are inherent in the technological momentum of strategic competition.

"The ultimate intent of a strategy of suffocation is to halt the arms race in the laboratory. But an offer to halt the arms race at any stage is a step in the direction of genuine disarmament. The President of the United States has shown the way in recent weeks with his farsighted postponement of a decision to produce a special battlefield nuclear weapon. We must all hope that the response of the Soviet Union will be such as to make it possible to extend that postponement indefinitely.

Non-proliferation

"So much for the vertical dimension of the nuclear problem. Let me now say a word about the horizontal spread of nuclear capabilities.

"There are those who have a fatalistic view of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They argue that nuclear proliferation is ultimately unavoidable and that there is little sense in putting undue constraints on the international flow of nuclear energy resources in the hope of being able to stem the process.

"I do not share that view. I note with satisfaction that the list of countries said to be on the verge of a nuclear weapons

Special Session delegates

Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson heads Canada's delegation at the UN Special Session.

The other delegates are:

Representatives – William Barton, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York; R. Harry Jay, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva; Kenneth B. Williamson, Department of External Affairs.

Parliamentary Observers – Marcel Prud'homme, M.P., Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence; Gus MacFarlane, M.P.; Douglas Roche, M.P.; David MacDonald, M.P.; Andrew Brewin, M.P.

Other parliamentarians are expected to participate.

capability is not very different today from what it was a decade or so ago. I believe world security would be seriously diminished by the further spread of nuclear weapons and that it is the responsible course for governments to pursue policies based on the presumption that proliferation can be stopped.

"We in Canada have perhaps gone further in our support for an effective non-proliferation system than have most other countries. In part, this is the result of national experience. But in much larger part, it is a reflection of public opinion in Canada which does not believe that we would be serving the cause of a rational world order by being negligent in the requirements we place on Canadian nuclear exports.

Canada's safeguards policy

"I make no apology for Canada's precedent-setting safeguards policy though it has been criticized by some as being too stringent. Canada is asking of others no more than what we have ourselves accepted voluntarily as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have not manipulated our safeguards for commercial advantage nor have we hesitated to accept commercial loss where our safeguards have inhibited nuclear sales. We have shared our technology freely with developing countries and we have applied our safeguards to all on a non-discriminatory basis and without trying to distinguish between capability and intention.

"Canada judged it necessary to adopt a national policy even though nuclear transfers were already within the compass of international regulation. Canadian action was based on genuine concern about our role as a nuclear supplier. We did not think that the international safeguards system, as it stood, was likely to be equal to the problems posed by the advance of nuclear technology. Our object was to bring about a new, more effective international consensus. Canada recognizes that the international system will need time to adapt to the new energy situation. It is now accepted by all that nuclear energy will have to play an increasing part in meeting incremental world energy needs in the remainder of the century. It is equally accepted that the benefits of nuclear energy must be accessible to all countries having no alternative energy options.

"It is understandable that, with the experience of another energy crisis still fresh in their minds, many countries would like to aim at a high degree of energy independence. In particular, they will expect to be protected against the interruption, without due cause, of essential supplies of nuclear fuel. Any new system will need to accommodate these aspirations.

"But we shall also have to consider that we are hovering on the threshold of a plutonium economy. We shall have to make sure that the vulnerable points in the fuel cycle are capable of being adequately safeguarded by technical means and that, where that cannot be effectively done, we can devise institutional arrangements for international management. I believe that, in the end, the best prospect for countries to assure their national energy security lies in an international system that carries the confidence of nuclear suppliers.

"There are limits to the contribution that can be made by nations acting unilaterally. I believe that Canada's efforts to date have been constructive and effective. But further achievement can be made only through multilateral agreement. We intend to play our full part in the working out of the assurances and the constraints that will inevitably have to form part of an enhanced international system of non-proliferation."

Conventional weapons and peacekeeping
Prime Minister Trudeau went on to speak about conventional weapons restraint,
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