

the greater part of his force, to arrive at Fort Erie at 8 a.m., Lieut. Col. Dennis and myself to go round the coast in a steam tug, taking a company of volunteer artillery to reconnoitre the shore between Fort Erie and Black Creek, and to return to Fort Erie in time to meet Lieut. Col. Booker at 8—should Col. Peacocke approve of this he would march by the river road from Chippewa and make a combined attack with Lieut. Col. Booker at some point between Fort Erie and Black Creek, cutting off the enemy's retreat by the river; the tug employed cruising up and down the river, cutting off any boats that might attempt to escape and communicating between the forces advancing from Chippewa and from Erie. I communicated this proposed change to Col. Peacocke; both by letter and telegraph, omitting however, I think, to mention the use proposed to be made of the tug. The plan was merely a modification of that proposed by Lieut. Col. Dennis, who wished to move at once with the volunteers without arranging a junction with Colonel Peacocke. Before receiving any answer from Col. Peacocke, I went off in the tug with Lieut. Col. Dennis and the company of artillery, leaving word with Lieut. Col. Booker to take care and obtain Col. Peacocke's approval to the proposed change before acting on it, and explaining the plan previously determined on in case Col. Peacocke should desire him to adhere to it. We arrived at Fort Erie about 5 a.m., steamed along there, and past Frenchman's Creek, where we saw the enemy's camp apparently deserted. After carefully examining the shore from Erie to Black Creek, and seeing no signs of any armed force, we went ashore at Black Creek, and were informed that the enemy had broken up their camp during the night. A party was seen by the inhabitants moving along the river in the direction of Chippewa, and the remainder to have turned inland at Black Creek. As far as I could make out from the size and appearance of their camp, and from the reports of the people, their combined force could not have exceeded 700 or 800 men. I then returned with Lieut. Col. Dennis, by water, to Fort Erie, as appointed with Lieut. Col. Booker. That officer not having arrived, I became aware that Col. Peacocke had acted on his original plan; but from the information I had gained was of opinion that he would not have more than 400 or 500 men to contend with. Lieut. Col. Dennis then landed the company of artillery, and I proceeded with it patrolling the road and heights between Fort Erie and Black Creek. Between 30 and 40 prisoners were taken by the company or handed over by civilians and put on board the tug at Black Creek. Seeing nothing more to be done at Fort Erie, I drove up to the railway station, on the line to Colborne, to ascertain whether telegraphic communication had been opened, and obtained what information I could. This station is about half a mile from Fort Erie and to the westward of the high road from Colborne. I had hardly entered the station when I heard a cry that troops were coming down the hill between myself and the town. I jumped into my conveyance and turned towards Erie to give the alarm to the company of volunteers left there. Finding the approach to Erie cut off and the enemy's skirmishers stealing round to surround me, I turned round and drove

to the shore in the direction of Colborne. Near Ridgway, I turned up towards the high road, and passing the railway bridge found it on fire. I stopped and got some buckets from a neighbouring farm, and, with the assistance of the driver, managed to put out the fire. I then went on to the garrison road, when I heard an account of the engagement with Col. Booker's force and of its retreat to Colborne. I found two wounded men at a road-side house; one of them I took into Colborne; the other was too badly hurt to move. I arrived at Colborne between 6 and 7 in the evening. The force had been increased since the previous day, and now consisted of the seven P. A. O., with 4 Companies of the 22nd Oxford and the Drumbo Company attached, 2 Companies of Home Guard, the Caledonia and the Queen's Own and 13th—in all about 1,400 men. The garrison was in the greatest state of confusion, and the troops that had been engaged in the morning considerably exhausted from want of rest and food. I ordered what assistance I could to Col. Booker who appeared quite overcome by fatigue and anxiety. He begged me to undertake all necessary arrangements, and later in the evening requested me to take the command out of his hands. Finding this was the wish of other volunteer officers of superior rank to myself, I telegraphed for instructions, and was desired by Col. Lowry to take the command. I posted a line of out-lying pickets, at a radius of one mile from the town, extending from the shore to the Welland Canal, with strong supports in rear, and ordered the remainder of the troops to lie down and get what rest they could. I telegraphed in various directions for food and ammunition, and by 2 a.m. on Sunday 3rd had an ample supply of both. About 1 o'clock, the alarm was sounded, and officers and civilians rushed up informing me that the enemy was marching on us in force and within 500 yards west of the town, where I had placed no pickets. The alarm was entirely without foundation, but had the effect of depriving the troops of the few hours rest they might have had. All through the night, reports were coming in of large forces being landed on the shore between Colborne and Erie, also without foundation. I sent the tug boat, however, still kept at our service by its owner, Mr. McCollum, to watch the shore between Colborne and Erie, and called on some of the civilians to act as scouts, and keep me informed of any movements in the neighbourhood. Reville was sounded at three, and I immediately made what arrangements I could for serving out rations and ammunition. At five o'clock, sending a pilot engine in front, I moved by rail towards Erie, taking the whole of the troops except the 13th, whom I left to guard Fort Colborne. Hearing the enemy were posted near Ridgway, and finding a favourable position for forming up the troops, at B. in Sketch, on a road known as Skirk's crossing, I disembarked the men, threw out a line of skirmishers, with four supports from the 7th P. A. O., with orders for the flank supports to wheel outwards and extend at once in case of any sign of a flank attack. In this order, and with a strong rear-guard, I advanced from "B" to the garrison road, and from thence towards Fort Erie. On coming to the scene of the previous day's engagement, at "C," I ascertained