

Included in the Final Act was a statement on the "Follow-up to the Conference" which deemed the CSCE to be an ongoing process. The follow-up meetings have a threefold function, 1) to review implementation records of signatories, 2) to consider new proposals, and 3) to adopt a concluding document.

The initial follow-up meeting held in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978 was a failure, although its very occurrence was important. The meeting continued the Helsinki process and elicited reaction from the Soviet Union. At Belgrade, the "Helsinki Process" developed as many of the procedural and technical questions raised in previous negotiations were finally established. This was significant in the initial stages of the CSCE because of early Soviet reliance on procedure in order to make points or diffuse the arguments of the West. But a more important point was that Belgrade provided the first opportunity for the established Helsinki Watch groups to begin the public procedure of highlighting the violations of the Final Act. At Belgrade, the United States was in the forefront representing the groups which had been formed in the two years following the signing of the Accords.

Three years of Madrid

The Madrid Meeting was anticipated by all signatories to be a potential watershed in the development of the CSCE. It was to convene nine short months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in a period following the harshest crackdown on dissidents and Helsinki group monitors. The mood of the participants was one of dismay and uncertainty as to what could possibly develop at the meeting. It was expected to be a short meeting. This did not happen, and after lengthy and bitter negotiations, the Madrid Review Meeting ended three years later to the day. The meeting itself contained a dynamic which can be said to apply only to the Helsinki process. Throughout the three years of negotiations there was always time for participating states to raise concerns. Thus, the Madrid Meeting was not only dominated by a determined US delegation desirous of a substantial concluding document, but also by reaction to political upheavals in the Warsaw Pact countries, notably the imposition of martial law in Poland, the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the death of Leonid I. Brezhnev. On the US side, the Madrid Meeting saw the change of administrations from the beleaguered Jimmy Carter to the high riding Ronald Reagan.

Although Madrid appeared to be set back continually by international events, one of the main successes was that it forced the Soviet Union to accept certain CSCE procedures. A member of the US delegation commented in a Congressional hearing that, the Soviets "are very conservative, they move very slowly, they are very intransigent in their positions. But over the past five years, they have come to accept not only that human rights is a legitimate topic for discussion but so is the discussion of individual cases and criticisms of the record of a particular government on implementation."

The Madrid Meeting concluded on September 9, 1983, with a substantial final document, the "Purple Book," appropriately in the wake of yet another nail in the coffin of détente — the shooting down of KAL 007. The Meeting

ended both with general dissatisfaction on all sides and with the CSCE tradition of continuing the mandate. This continuation was in the guise of further experts' meetings as well as a full scale review meeting to convene in Vienna (a compromise location from Brussels and Bucharest) in November 1986. The other meetings mandated were the Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean, the Budapest Cultural Forum, the Ottawa Meeting on Human Rights, and the Human Contacts Meeting in Bern. Finally, on Soviet insistence, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, set to begin in Stockholm in January 1984 was negotiated into the Madrid Concluding Document. This fulfilled the main Soviet aim to bring about a specific meeting on military security issues in Europe.

Application has been the subject of heated discussions in the various forums that have taken place within the CSCE realm. Western states have objected strongly to the systematic Soviet harassment of Helsinki Group members which has forced them either to disband, as the Moscow Group did in September 1982, or to go underground. A recent example of the application debate was at the Ottawa Meeting of Experts on Human Rights in 1985. At this CSCE meeting there was a full discussion on many political aspects of the human rights question, with participation from all participants. The Meeting was closed to the media except for the opening and closing statements. The dissemination of information, however, was adequate because of briefings to the press by various national delegations.

Survival

The main theme of Soviet and East European participation in recent CSCE meetings has been perpetuation and survival. The Soviets have wanted to perpetuate the CSCE process, and in doing so, survive the negative effects of the meetings in Ottawa, Budapest and Bern.

Due to the benefits derived, the Soviets are anxious to continue the CSCE process and, in doing so, prove their adherence to it. Recently the most important benefit at stake was the continuation of the European Security Conference in Stockholm. The Stockholm conference brought several advances in the confidence-building measures area of the Helsinki accords. Specifically, these were the lowering of the troop size required for notification of maneuvers from 25,000 to 13,000, and the increased time period for notification from twenty-one to forty-two days. The most publicized and significant result, however, was the agreement relating to compliance and verification. By including these forty-five detailed provisions, the CSCE process did what many other East-West forums had failed to do — bring about an agreement with the principle of on-site verification. The success should not have been a surprise, considering the continued enthusiasm of the Soviet Union which had, from the beginning, vigorously supported the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The other benefits for the Soviets are those in Basket I, notably Principles III and IV, the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity. Beyond that, there are economic