to proceed along the beach to Egmont-op-Zee. After every thing had been properly arranged, it moved forward, supported by 1,000 cavalry, under Lord Paget. It was intended that the reserve, under Colonel M'Donald, should cover our flank, and that the column should rapidly advance to Egmont, in order to turn the flank of the enemy at Bergen. This was, however, prevented by a strong body of the enemy, who engaged the reserve the moment it ascended the sand hills; and although he retreated before the reserve, he constrained Colonel M'Donald to follow in a different direction to that intended, thereby leaving our left flank uncovered. But this did not impede our moving forward, and it was not until we had proceeded five or six miles that we found the least opposition. The enemy then appeared in small force, and the 25th was ordered up the sand hills, but, he having increased, the 79th followed, and it was not long before the 49th was also ordered to form on the left of that regiment. It is impossible to give you an adequate idea of the nature of the ground, which I can only compare to the sea in a storm. On my getting to the left of the 79th, I found that its flank was already turned, and that the ground, which we were to occupy, did not afford the least shelter: my determination was instantly taken. I had gone on horseback to view the ground, and on my return to the regiment, which I met advancing, I found the left actually engaged with the enemy, who

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\* The general See Ap

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