

if a credible balance of strategic deterrence is to be maintained. The inclusion of an agreed data base and counting rules is also a step forward in arms control.

That is why we think a comprehensive test ban (CTB) is also important, and why we have advocated the opening, at an appropriate stage, of negotiations on a cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. These kinds of agreements would help to slow the momentum of weapons development in nuclear weapon states. They would also make a contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both objectives are vital to the maintenance of global stability in the years ahead.

We regret that the Committee on Disarmament has not yet been given the opportunity to begin work on a CTB. While we do not think that calls by this Assembly for a negotiating timetable are always helpful, we do believe that concrete action towards a complete ban is necessary soon, especially in view of the convening of the Second Review Conference on the NPT in August 1980. According to authoritative public sources, there were more tests of nuclear weapons in 1978 than in any year since 1970. At the least, the numbers of tests must be reduced if confidence in the objectives agreed as long ago as 1963 is to be maintained. A further step along the road to nuclear disarmament would be a cessation and ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices. Partial measures of nuclear arms control, including a so-called cut-off, are to be preferred to comprehensive negotiations which have little prospect of success. We acknowledge that the verification of an agreement not to produce such material for weapons purposes would pose difficult technical and political questions. These questions need examination, even if negotiations are deemed inappropriate for the time being, and we may wish to consider how to bring this about.

We are pleased that the Committee on Disarmament has looked into the question of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, and has made some modest progress. We think the Committee should return to this subject early in 1980. It is entirely understandable that non-nuclear weapon states not part of a system of nuclear deterrence should be interested in assurances against nuclear attack. These weapons, as I have said, are not soon going to disappear. That being the case, pledges of non-use by those states that possess nuclear weapons are of considerable significance, even in the carefully defined circumstances which each nuclear-weapon state has put on the record. It may now be feasible to work out international arrangements which would strengthen the security of non-nuclear weapon states. It is important to increase confidence amongst all states that they will not be the object of surprise attack or the victims of miscalculation. A condition of such confidence is information. Reliable information about these matters and some structure of agreed and specific restrictions on use will help to increase confidence that nuclear war can be avoided.

Canada's views about other items on our agenda will be stated at the appropriate time. Our general approach to arms control and disarmament negotiations will, however, be influenced by the following general objectives. First, we will give pre-

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