It has not been difficult throughout most of the postwar period to define the main goals of Canadian foreign policy. We have been living under a massive threat from militant Communism in circumstances of Cold War which robbed the United Nations of its ability to perform its main peace-keeping operations under Article 43 of the Charter. Clearly, our first duty has been to help maintain the peace through collective-security arrangements, and this we have done through playing our full part in NATO and NORAD consistent with our resources. It represents our contribution to the deterrent which has successfully kept a precarious peace while time and internal developments in the Communist world could work towards a more stable basis for international relations.

In this same period of dangerous confrontation between major military alliances, we have worked steadfastly to reduce and ultimately to bring under firm control the means for waging annihilating major wars. This we have done through our active participation in New York and in Geneva in the work of successive disarmament conferences, recognizing that there was no ultimate security in an unrestricted arms race and that balanced, phased disarmament was an alternative and less costly route to the same end. Our support for an end of nuclear testing under adequate safeguards and for limitations on the dissemination of nuclear weapons should be seen as respectively qualitative and quantitative controls aimed at reducing war-making capacity.

At the same time, and in this same period, there has been an urgent need to improve the international means of dealing with limited wars and regional disputes, and otherwise developing the means for the peaceful settlement of potentially dangerous conflicts. Here our support for the United Nations both in its mediation functions and in its peace-keeping roles has been the main vehicle for Canadian action.

It has been reasonably obvious up to now that the main emphasis in our foreign and defence policies had to be on practical measures of collective security since it would have been foolhardy indeed to rely excessively on the fragile international experiment in international peace-keeping.

But the nature of the threat is in transition. Under the umbrella of mutual deterrence, the major nations have been groping towards a move civilized relationship. The contest will go on, but its arena will be increasingly in the ideological and trade spheres, with much attention being paid to winning the support of less-developed countries. In our anxiety to make our best contribution to international peace and stability, the West must not overlook the second major force of instability in the world -- the gap between the "have" and "have-not" nations, which unhappily is paralleled also by the division of the world along colour lines. Here the Commonwealth is a major instrument for peace at our ready disposal, and should be cherished and fostered, particularly through technical assistance and aid programmes.

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