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- c) the training of Foreign Service Officers is narrowly departmental in focus and, consequently, Foreign Service Officers' appreciation of non-departmental government-wide objectives and rationales is deficient and can lead to less than effective or even counter-productive representation of Canadian interests;
 - d) our foreign operations tend to compartmentalize activities related to economics and financial concerns or trade problems and promotion rather than pulling all of these together, i.e., they do not necessarily give expression to the conviction that our foreign policy and the state of our economy must be seen as inextricably joined;
 - e) our posts abroad don't necessarily function, and are not always perceived as functioning, as representative of the whole of the Canadian Government - rather, they can seem to be collections of individual representatives of individual departments;
 - f) the difficulties associated with secondments and lateral transfers from the domestic service to the foreign service and from one branch of the foreign service to another create artificial barriers to the best use of scarce resources and to cross-fertilization between the domestic and foreign services at the level of potential and actual senior managers;
 - g) Heads of Post, who should be the unifying and cohesive force in their missions, have been given authority over all post operations, but, because their control of post personnel is incomplete and because their own career development has usually not provided them with sufficiently broad experience either at home or abroad, they are not often capable of fulfilling this function as effectively as should be the case.