

its dislike of participation in a merely negative anti-Soviet alliance. Hence the Canadian emphasis upon Article 2. In this field little progress has been made to date.

3. In Canadian policy towards the United States there is the initial paradox that, although this country is more dependent upon the United States than ever before in its history, both economically and politically, it is less directly obligated to the United States than any other country in the free world. It is, therefore, in a stronger position to offer comment and criticism. When criticism is made it is, however, normally done privately and informally in order to avoid an open showdown or to make public formal disagreement. With the United States Canada has worked out a policy of joint defence for North America, but in so doing has had to struggle to maintain its independence and autonomy. In this effort to maintain autonomy, the Department has had less support than might be expected from other departments concerned with the strain upon their budgets of defence costs and with problems of taxation. It has been frequently embarrassed by the "creeping mobilization" defence policies formulated in the Pentagon, on which Canada is seldom informed before far-reaching requests are presented for urgent consideration. The impact of U.S. policies upon Canadian foreign policy is illustrated by our anxiety to avoid any impression of "ganging-up" policies being pursued by the Commonwealth in economics or strategy, and in subordinating our views on such questions as the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO when such a policy is strongly advocated by Washington. The one major field where we have been most critical of U.S. leadership and have differed most openly has been in the handling of the war in Korea. The record shows that many of our problems in negotiating with the United States have arisen from American clumsiness in emphasis and timing.

4. Canadian policy towards the U.S.S.R. since 1946 has undergone drastic modification. Early in 1946 it was hoped by "consistent, cautious and patient efforts" (Mr. King's phrase) to further co-operation between the Soviet Union and the West. This policy was soon succeeded by one of "firmness tempered with fairness". By 1948 it was hoped that the development of sufficient strength by the West would create an equilibrium between the two worlds and make possible a period of peaceful co-existence of the free world and the Soviet area during which there might be some "mellowing" of Soviet policy. Since Korea, the emphasis has been more and more on the possibility of war when the Soviet Union feels strong enough within to take the risk of challenging the West or believes that it must act before the West becomes too strong.

5. In our relations with the Commonwealth there has been less shift of attitude from pre-war days at the ministerial level than in any other field. This has been reflected in controversies over the nature of consultation, in dislike of formal meetings of the High Commissioners in London, in unwillingness to participate in the Berlin airlift, and in objections to attempts in Whitehall to formulate "joint defence" plans or "Commonwealth economic strategy". The Canadian emphasis has been upon more informality in association coupled with opposition to attempts at developing inner or outer circles of friendship.