

Chapter Sixteen

International Verification Organization

teristics or activities of an opponent's weapons and forces, verification must assess only whether those characteristics or activities exceed the limitations imposed by an agreement. Verification is as likely to be an exercise of qualification as one of determination of capability or intent. Verification is likely to be most successful in an atmosphere of cooperation, and violations of slight military importance, unless they appear unintentional and are corrected when discovered, may deserve particular attention. Verification, under an agreement, is therefore of equal importance to all contracting parties.

It must be drawn to the attention of theorists who argue the difficulty of translating conceptualization into reality, that functional international verification organizations do already exist. In large measure they span the gamut of arms control problems, however inadequately, and when viewed together provide working prototypes from which more effective organizations could be developed. Some, but not all, of these are sponsored or associated with the United Nations. The significance of these organizations is that while they have been developed to function under a specialized mandate, they incorporate the development of systems, operating procedures and terms of reference which, with modification, could apply to an arms-control scenario. In the nuclear field, the International Atomic Energy Agency (See Annex C) is active in developing and monitoring a programme of nuclear safeguards. In terms of chemical weapons verification and, more lately, of conventional arms monitoring, the Armaments Control Agency of the Western European Union acts as a model (Annex D). A number of United Nations Observer Missions, beginning with the United Nations Treaty Supervisory Organization, which was established in 1948 and which continues to operate today, have, by means of control and observer posts and liaison teams, provided effective verification of troop movements, disengagement zones and limited arms areas.

While, as mentioned earlier, observer missions do not necessarily require high technology systems to be effective, the United Nations activities in the Sinai have benefited in this regard. The development and operation of the Sinai Field Mission (Annex E) in the buffer zone, as part of the disengagement arrangements agreed to by both signatories, have provided significant experience in the application of seismic and remote sensing systems to a practical arms-control scenario. It includes as well aspects of the utilization of national and international systems within an overall verification organization.

Finally, the ISMA proposal of France, as previously mentioned, concerns a verification system that is central to the package of systems collectively referred to as "Remote Sensing: National Technical Means (NTM)".