

Abstract

This work provides a comprehensive, detailed review of the theory and history of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).

While the term "Confidence-Building Measures" is most frequently thought of in the context of the 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), many previous examples exist which the author examines. From this examination the author concludes that "CBMs are interwoven within the larger category of arms control agreements to a degree greater than is normally appreciated".

The history of the CSCE and developments at its review conferences in Belgrade and Madrid are next examined. CBMs in the CSCE are remarkable "because they are the central and dominant component of an international security agreement rather than an ancillary feature of a large agreement". The author concludes that the CSCE process so far has been, at best, modestly successful.

In contrast, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which are next discussed, have been less productive. MBFR is, however, a confidence-building process which reveals much about the basic perceptions and approaches of the two sides. The history of MBFR is reviewed, highlighting the obstacles which have been encountered. The Associated Measures, which are the confidence-building component of these talks, are also focussed upon. As was true for the examination of pre-CSCE CBMs, the review of MBFR illustrates the definitional problem with the concept. This problem is next addressed.

Because inferring a general explanation of the CBM concept from historical examples is not productive, the author turns to the work of academic analysts "to conduct a more flexible, wider-ranging and internally consistent understanding" of CBMs. After reviewing in detail the statements provided by a variety of analysts, the author synthesizes the following definition of Military Confidence-Building Measures. They are:

1. a variety of arms control measures entailing
2. state action
3. that can be unilateral but are more often either bilateral or multilateral

4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas".

Having reached a "consensus" definition of CBMs the author focusses on the types of CBMs proposed. After examining several categorizations he suggests the following typology:

(a) *Information and Communication CBMs*

1. Information Measures
2. Communication Measures
3. Notification Measures
4. Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

(b) *Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs*

1. Inspection Measures
2. Non-Interference Measures
3. Behavioural or "Tension-Reducing" Measures
4. Deployment Constraint Measures

(c) *Declaratory CBMs.*

Using this typology the author next reviews in detail proposals for CBMs made in the literature, many of which may be considered at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The author then turns to an assessment of confidence-building theory and practice. In this section of his work he begins by discussing several generic flaws of CBM literature. Nine flaws are identified:

1. indifference to the offensive substance of Soviet defence policy and capabilities;