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CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, MAY 21.—There is now no deficiency in any article, so far as I can learn, and no army was ever so amply and luxuriously provided. The amount of shot, shell, powder, and destructive missiles of all kinds stored at our military depots or actually in the batteries is very great, and it is amply sufficient to enable us to bombard Sebastopol for a fortnight from guns of greater calibre, and placed very much closer to the enemy, than we have yet been able to open upon them. The rumor is that we open fire on the 24th, but that they may be a ruse to distract the attention of "gossips and correspondents" from the expedition. As to the operations of the French army, nothing is known with any certainty. Their engineers keep an accurate journal of the siege, which will, no doubt, see the light in some time to come, but any attempt to describe their mining operations, their saps, or engineering works, would be worthless and absurd, simply because there are no means of getting at the facts. General Canrobert was kind enough to give me a pass to the trenches some time ago, and I availed myself of it to visit them on two occasions recently. I was even allowed to enter the gallery leading to one of the mines, but I found that the engineers, though extremely courteous and kind, were not at liberty to speak of the future, even to their own officers of other branches of the service. The operations which have been described as the springing of mines have chiefly been the explosion of "globes of compression" and their effect in front of Bastion No. 4 (Flagstaff Advanced Battery) has been to bring the French too near to the enemy, for they have been annoyed by grenades in the lodgments without being able to advance materially from their position. All our own batteries are in admirable order, and the effect of our fire from the second parallel and from the advanced batteries will be tremendous, though our losses from the enemy's fire at the shortened distance must be proportionally greater than it has been. Hitherto we have made little use of carcasses, a kind of shell perforated with three holes, out of which the internal composition burns fiercely, firing whatever it comes in contact with, and giving forth an intense light. The Russians, on the contrary, have used both carcasses and fire-balls freely, and have derived considerable advantage from them in their nocturnal attacks, as they have been able to see our position clearly, while they were shrouded in darkness. From the number of carcasses recently sent up to the front it is to be presumed we intend to make use of them at the next bombardment. There was a plan some time ago proposed by an engineer to save us from surprises. It consisted of wires placed at the distance of a few feet from poles fixed in the ground, and so arranged as to set fire to blue lights on being touched. For some reason or other the project has not been carried out. We have been unable to enfilade the Russian works to any extent, owing to the ravines and the skill of the Russian engineers. The great object of the attacking engineer is to place the line of his batteries at right angles to the prolongation of the faces of the batteries of the enemy, and by that means to obtain an enfilading fire. The Russian engineers have frustrated this object in the present instance by the judicious position of their defences. The prolongations of the faces of the Redan, of the Garden Battery, of the Flagstaff, of the Round Tower, and of the redoubts to the east, terminate, with few exceptions, in ravines, or run at right angles to positions inaccessible to us. Hence our fire has been "direct," and has lacked the advantages usually derivable from a choice of ground on the part of the besiegers, and the points of attack are so widely extended, that the Allies have not been able to obtain any considerable amount of concentrated fire. It must be remembered that earthworks, however admirable for the purpose of immediate attack or defence, are unsuited for permanent defence. They are constantly "breaking down," decay and decadence are their inseparable conditions, and if we were to retire from Sebastopol to-morrow, and if the Russians were to leave their works unrepared, a winter's snow and rain and the action of the weather would in a few months destroy the works, which now represent the aggressive force of four nations and the defensive power of one. It is probable, therefore, notwithstanding the eulogies bestowed upon earth-works, that if the Allies were to break up their camp to-morrow, and leave the Russians to themselves, they would find on returning in a few years that the lines of the present works would be represented by solid stone, and that the Redan and Mamelon would be crowned with redoubts of masonry. It is in consequence of the rapidly decaying property of earth-works that our labors have been so great—they are like a London house; there is always something to be done, and our losses made good repairs effected.

they cannot be left alone for twenty-four hours. The action of shot and shell upon them, of course, accelerates the destructive influences of the weather, and of time—gabions are knocked to pieces in a moment, instead of the willow and twig ribs becoming rotten in the sun and rain, and parapets fall down, and ditches are filled up by the iron shower, more rapidly but not more surely, than by the rains of heaven. I need scarcely say that the statements which have appeared in some of your contemporaries respecting the establishment of batteries within 180 or 200 yards of the Malakoff are not correct. There is no parallel armed with mortars or heavy guns within twice that distance of the place indicated and the fact of the Mamelon being 500 yards in front of it (nearly due south of it) sufficiently proves the absurdity of these assertions. Our nearest parallel in front of the left attack is more than 500 yards from the enemy's works, and there we must stop, because the ground is so steep that no earthworks could be formed upon it. At one portion of this attack, however, where our lines incline towards the north to meet the French, we made a curve which brings us nearer to the enemy, but the ground is unfavorable for the construction of batteries. On the right attack front our lines have been advanced close to the enemy's centre approaches, but the latter are considerably in front of the Mamelon and Round Tower. It is said that one of the privates of the 48th Regiment has given some very valuable information respecting the terrain of Sebastopol, and has corrected a serious misconception under which our engineers were laboring respecting the course of a creek in front of the left attack. The man had been for some years in Russia, and as a stonemason he labored at the works of Sebastopol, and knows every street in it. He pointed out the position of the terminus of the water works, and of the engines working it, and it is now stated that there are no less than 100 guns all hidden from view defending those works, and raking the Redan, so that had we assaulted and carried that formidable work we should have met a fire on which none of our officers had calculated. The uncertain reports we receive respecting the strength of the garrison are most perplexing. But how can it be otherwise? Is Ivan Ivanovitch or Stanislas Petrowsky likely to be better informed respecting the strength of the force to which he belongs than John Smith, No. 2003 of the 88th, or Daniel O'Connor, No. 609, of the 41st Welsh, is with regard to our army? And what do they know? It's ten to one if they could tell you the name of their generals. There is a strong conviction that the large camp on the north side of Sebastopol, which has been recently augmented, has very much of the dummy about it, as very few men can be detected in it. On the other hand, it is said that it is a sanitarium we are looking at; if so, there must be many sick and wounded outside Sebastopol. But why should the Russians place their hospital tents in sight of us, and put them in a hollow, instead of placing them on the hill above? If I were to be permitted to state my own opinions, I should say that the principal body of the Russian army, under Osten-Sacken, is encamped and bottled among the forests between the Belbek and the heights to the westward of Mackenzie's Farm. Their signal posts and telegraphs would enable them to communicate either with Simpheropol or Sebastopol in a few minutes, and from these heights they could pour down with comparative ease, either to defend the north side, resist any attempts of ours to get round by Inkermann, or fill their intrenched camps and lines over the Tchernaya by Tchorgoun. As to the army of Baidar, it is no more to be regarded, according to all accounts, than last year's snow. It has melted away; and we bear that it has been absorbed altogether, but no one knows how or where. It is not unlikely that, finding we were not disposed to make an attempt to force the passes on our right and rear, the corps was withdrawn to Simpheropol, or to the forts near Kertch. It is certain that the Russians require an immense number of men to keep their communications in order, and to bring up their supplies to Sebastopol, wherever they may come from. Should they indeed be short of material, it may be easy to estimate the difficulties they encounter in dragging up shot, shell, cannon, and powder from their depots hundreds of miles away, by referring to the great labor we have to undergo, railway and all, in furnishing our batteries; only seven miles from the sea, with the requisite armament and ammunition. We have utterly failed in our quick-dashing game, or what was intended to be so—short whilst played by professors of the old game; but if we can descend to the waiting game we must win, although every month's delay may certainly exalt the prestige of Russia, not only in barbarous Asia, but in civilized Europe, as a military power. It seems certain that Russia intended a diversion in the direction of India, had we not deranged her plans by the invasion of the Crimea. There is a Russian officer now at headquarters who belonged

to a regiment that was actually told off for a march to India last year. There were several other regiments destined for the same expedition, but they too found themselves encamped on the Alma on the 19th of September, and on the road to Bakhiserai the following evening. The officers had been provided with books relating to India, and had been studying "the manners and customs" of the Hindoos and Mussulmans of the great peninsula. It is said to be sure, that it would be impossible for the Russians to transport an army over the torrid wastes which lie between them and India, but there was a certain Alexander who once moved a very efficient army in the same direction, through regions less populous and less cultivated; and though modern warfare is waged with more difficulty, and is attended with considerations respecting greater impediments; we might find that if a Russian Alexander the Great ever rose in these times our calculations were valueless, as all calculations are which make nought of the inspirations and miracles of military genius. The officer in question "hath a pleasant wit," and gives abundant proofs, in the pleasant couplets he remembers concerning the war, that the Russians are by no means destitute of humor. He sings one song anent the proceedings of Prince Menschikoff after the battle of the Alma, which is said, by those who can appreciate it to be intensely funny. The Prince is represented as having fled to a house in Bakhiserai, out of the window of which he interrogates the passers-by respecting the fate of Sebastopol, and he is at least astonished to hear it has not been taken, and begins to dance with joy, to extol his grand flank march, and to boast of his splendid defence of the place. Another song, from the same mouth, puts the contest in a ludicrous light, and declares that the whole siege is only a struggle to see whether the Russians or the Allies are the best diggers and ditchers:—"We build one redoubt, they build another; they make one trench, we make its brother, &c. The gentleman is a Pole, and was present at Alma and Inkermann. At the latter battle the company he commanded lost seventy-five men out of 130. He then served with the external army, but got tired of Tchorgoun and blasé with the monotony of life in huts. He collected all his resources, and gave a grand ball to all his friends in the army near Tchorgoun—champagne at 30s. a bottle, claret at 20s., and pickles at 10s.—and next day came into our cavalry pickets, with a brother officer, on the day of the races of Karanyi, and has been living here ever since. How the scarcity of water has already excited a positive panic is described by a correspondent of the *Morning Advertiser*:—"Before Sebastopol, May 22.—The springs in camp are already beginning to dry up, and the soldiers have to go farther and farther every day for water, which, when obtained, is very muddy and bad. Dire is the confusion, dreadful the kicking, at the few watering-places up there for horses and mules.—An officer yesterday told me that his servant took his horse at six o'clock in the morning to get him watered, and he was an hour and a half before he could get his turn. It is said that very shortly, if the decrease of water continue as at present, we shall have, as a matter of necessity, to cross the Tchernaya and hold the valley of Inkermann, to supply ourselves with water. When up at the Guards' camp, on the heights of Balaklava, I observed several parties of men digging for water, in places where a slight moisture on the surface gave promise of a spring." ENGLISH CAMP, May 22.—It has been resolved to send another secret expedition to the eastward of the Crimea. The expeditionary force is to be under the command of Sir George Brown, and will consist of the flank companies of the Guards, (600 men), the 71st, 42nd, and 93rd Highland Regiments, a battalion of Royal Marines, two batteries of artillery, an efficient staff of Commissariat officers, and a portion of the Land Transport Corps. The 4th Royal Irish Dragoons and the 10th Hussars have received orders to embark, and it is probable that Major Branding's (the 1 troop) of Royal Horse Artillery will accompany them. The French force will consist of 10,000 men and 16 guns; a Turkish corps, 3000 strong, will also embark with the expedition, and a number of spades, pickaxes, and trenching tools are to be furnished to them; so that it is evident they are to be employed in throwing up works to cover themselves. It is expected that simultaneously with this movement there will be a demonstration on the plain of Balaklava. THE NEXT BOMBARDMENT. No less than twelve batteries in our left attack, and fifteen batteries in our right attack, armed with guns and mortars of the heaviest metal, and largest calibre, are prepared to operate against the enemy's defences. These batteries at present comprise one hundred and thirty guns, not less than 32-pounders

and thirty-five mortars, many of which are 13-inch, in the two attacks. Moreover, they are so much advanced that what were the advanced works, may now be regarded almost as the first parallel, for the new lines of batteries are but a few yards in rear of them. Whenever it opens, the fire of this third bombardment will, as much exceed that of the second, both in weight and destructive force, as the second exceeded that of the first. Already 200 rounds have been brought up for each gun, and the ground about the railway terminus, which is fast approaching the front, and the gun-wharf at Balaklava, are strewn with heaps of shot and shell, ready to be transported to their place of destination.

CONDITION OF THE TRENCHES. The cases of cholera generally occur in the trenches, the heat and nastiness of which are inconceivable.—The smell of the precincts of the batteries is overpowering and horrible. Nearly all day long there is pleasant breeze playing over the surface of the plateau, which tempers the ardor of the rays of the sun in the camps, but in the ravines and in the trenches and batteries it is rarely felt, and the result is that the heat is stifling.

RUSSIAN ACCOUNT OF THE INTERIOR OF SEBASTOPOL.

"In spite of all the efforts which the enemy have made, our bulwarks stand as fast as ever. Long before the bombardment began, the journals of the West informed us that our walls and forts were speedily to be put to a new proof. This made us redouble our precautions, and we bore firmly the truly murderous (*holzische*) fire which threatened all with destruction. Nevertheless, thousands were devoted to death, and it made one shudder to see the Elburus (the steam boat) pass every two hours during the bombardment from the south to the north with so many wounded that she could scarcely carry them.—White standing in Bastion No. 4—the bastion which suffered most of all—I forget the danger to which I was exposed in admiration of the cool and stoical conduct of our sailors. They fell and expired without a cry, though racked by the most fearful agonies. The southern side of our town has suffered most severely, and is scarcely to be recognised again. Five hundred houses have been totally destroyed, and grass is growing on their ruins. The beautiful theatre no longer exists. Though the upper districts of the town are not so much damaged, yet there is not a single house to be seen which does not bear manifest traces of the bombardment. The streets are everywhere rooted up by shot, and the pavement is totally destroyed, while at every corner stand whole pyramids of the enemy's cannon balls, and exploded shells, which were daily collected before the opening of the fire. In a great many streets five or six such pyramids are to be seen, each of them from about eight to ten feet high. Nevertheless, business is continued, and booths are opened for the sale of goods. Prices, however, are enormously raised, and sugar costs one silver rouble (2s.) per lb. The supply of meat is more than abundant, but bread is exceedingly scarce. The streets are filled with people, and crowds of children run to and fro, assisting at the construction of barricades, and pelting each other with balls of clay. Our life in Sebastopol is agreeable to us; for use is a second nature. The greatest accommodation prevails in the harbor of Ekaterin, where cannon balls, powder, facines, sacks, and provisions are landed in astounding quantities, as they are forwarded from the northern forts. In a word, neither the thunder of the enemy's cannon nor the siege of Sebastopol is suffered to disturb us any longer; we mourn over our adversaries, who are shedding their blood without result before our brazen walls. We read many absurd statements about the condition of the besieged; but the absurdest of all is, undoubtedly, the news that we suffer from want of supplies, and that hundreds and hundreds of us are daily cut off by death—of all of which no trace is to be seen."

THE RUSSIAN PRIVATE SOLDIERS.

It appears, by letters from Sebastopol, which have reached Vienna, that the statements of the spies of the abundance of our resources, the facility of our provisioning, the certain approach of reinforcements, and the calm confidence of our soldiers, have produced an unfavorable impression upon the garrison. Until these last few weeks the troops believed their officers, who assured them that the French and English, hemmed in on all sides, and weakened by privation and disease, were really the besieged, and were destined upon the arrival of enormous reinforcements from Perekop, to be driven into the sea. The renewed bombardment, and the infantry attacks in front of the Central and Quarantine Bastions, as well as the near approach of the French to the Flagstaff Bastion, have dissipated this delusion, and the mass of the troops have lapsed into moody sufferings and distrustful feelings.