

boats, each able to contain twenty-four arabas, which keep up the communication between the spit and the mainland."

The *Post* correspondent appears to fear the effect of release from trench-work upon the discipline of the troops—an observation that comes in aid of our own correspondent's suggestions in his last letter:—

"It requires a strong mind for any one who has gone through the last year's campaign, and remembers the incidents of last winter, quietly to contemplate remaining here another, to be followed by a spring campaign under the influences of the spirit which such a discipline shall effect. I feel convinced that the approaching winter, without probably the hard work, the trenches, and bad roads, when exertion was necessary to life, inspired, will be far more unprofitable than the last. Unless there is a moderate proportion of work and hardship, discipline will, as a matter of course, step in to take its place, from the absence of rational amusement. Last week the few hours officer or man could call his own were necessarily given to rest. Warm clothing, and comforts, eatable and drinkable, were then thought of at home to keep body and soul together. In my humble opinion a few cargoes of books and a sprinkling of billiard-tables might, next winter, prevent much recourse to gambling, and the brandy-bottle; but I am wandering far from where I commenced, and perhaps giving way too much to conviction."

General Mouraviëff reports to St. Petersburg of the Russian attack upon Kara, on the 29th of September that—

"In consequence of several officers of high rank having been killed or wounded early in the action, the assault was unsuccessful; but that, notwithstanding their losses, the Russian troops captured fourteen Turkish flags and that the blockade of Kara is re-established on the same footing as before the attack."

The Emperor of Russia has instituted a commission at Kioff to examine all prisoners from the Foreign Legions in the service of the allies. They are not to be treated as prisoners of war, but handed over to their respective Governments.

The Church Times.

HALIFAX, SATURDAY, NOV. 10, 1855.

We have had occasion at several periods, to notice malicious and unfounded statements with reference to the Church and her authorities, and to correct them. These sometimes emanate from parties who are not Churchmen, even in name, and at other times from Churchmen in name, but who, imbued with the spirit of malice and uncharitableness, do not much honor their Christian profession. Now it does appear to us, that Churchmen in reality, who desire to honor their profession, have a duty to perform in these matters, and that so plain and simple, that while it will be a justice to themselves, will at the same time mark their estimation of the efforts to throw discredit upon their Church, and to assail the reputation of those who are entitled to her high respect, and who are set over them in holy things.

The Church, as a religious body, is no more open to attacks, does nothing more to excite them, than any other of the denominations by whom she is surrounded. She simply desires to stand upon the same footing with others, claiming no distinctive privileges, but contending for an equality of rights; and manifests as little desire for aggression as can be laid to the charge of the most quiet of them. That she should be let alone to do the work of her Master, is all that she seeks. That her sacred character is entitled to no more respect than to be made the jest of every ribald buffoon, of any other sect or denomination, with no other reason than that it is his humour,—or that it may please any questionable Churchman to vent his malice or parade his ignorance for the purpose of her detraction,—is a state of things that if the sober judgment of the religious world does not condemn, it certainly is the bounden duty of her own children to discountenance.

The question naturally suggests itself—Why is the Church less sensitive than other denominations in these matters? It may be partly answered by observing the practices of those communions upon her members, who many of them do not observe that in an intimate connection with their schemes, they are in danger of sacrificing their own disinterestedness—a danger which as respects themselves, she often have sufficiently guarded against. None of these that we want of, especially of those in our midst, would suffer detraction without manifest disapprobation, both of the detractors and the instru-

ments by which they vent their malice. Other religious persuasions settle all their disputed points in the pages of their own papers; and with them the secular points are remarkably conscientious—careful not to intermeddle with any thing that concerns more particularly the Roman Catholic, Wesleyan, Presbyterian, and Baptist bodies; and were they to do so would be taught a lesson that would leave them but little inclined to a repetition of the offence. The Church however must be thought to be a different kind of game, against which every open enemy or treacherous friend may aim a shaft, the disposition to mischief being the only requisite qualification—vulnerable at every joint of the harness, but powerless to resist. We do not know why advantage should thus be taken of her disposition to bear and forbear, why it is more seemly that in her case the exception against parading religious matters in secular prints, should be overruled, or why it should be supposed that she is above being moved by practices which would stir the corruption of the professors of other phases of Christianity. Nor do we see why vindictiveness in the part of those that do not belong to her, should overcome the honorable conduct that should distinguish the gentleman, but more especially the Christian gentleman. Nor on the other hand must it be deemed that such practices are patiently borne, or that the circumstances do not admit of a thought as to the best mode of correction. Churchmen after all are but men, and no more than other denominations, can witness with patience insults offered to their Clergy; and those who delight in that sort of thing, may find themselves engaged in a suicidal effort, and will not derive much consolation from their self-inflicted wounds in the house of their friends.

THE news from the seat of war is highly interesting. The allied fleet relieved from the supervision of Sebastopol, and a considerable portion of the allied army relieved also from the investment of that stronghold, are making the best use of their time before the winter sets in, to establish bases for future operations. The Russian generals foreseeing the occupation of the force which had for so long a time been pent up before Sebastopol, have been rather beforehand in moving from thence to the points which are suddenly threatened, if not making preparations for a total evacuation of the Crimea. The wisdom of the siege of Sebastopol, whoever may be entitled to the merit of having recommended the Crimean invasion, is only now beginning to be properly appreciated. If not the chief naval depot of Russia in the Black Sea, as is disputed by those who see in Nicolaïff the head quarters of the Russian strength, we think it will be pretty generally conceded by what is taking place, that it is the key of the Crimea, and that its possession makes the occupation of the country by the Russian army a very hazardous undertaking. They can only keep it in fact by a great victory over the allies; and such a result as this, neither the quality of their troops by comparison, the ability of their generals, considerable it must be acknowledged, nor the desponding and hopeless tone of Prince Gortschakoff's despatches, which is a remarkable feature of late, and points to a like dispirited feeling in his army, makes at all probable.

The fleet as we were inclined to anticipate, had only made a demonstration at Odessa, which sufficiently frightened the inhabitants, and then proceeded to the mouths of the Dnieper and Bug, which by the taking of Kinburn and the destruction of Oczakoff, have been effectually sealed, and all the navy that Russia may have or can build at Nicolaïff, is in a much worse position than that which found a precarious shelter within the harbor of Sebastopol. The game is entirely a losing one for the Czar. Russian policy may point now to two modes of concluding it,—one by drawing the enemy into Russia Proper, under an impression that they would waste their strength and find it invulnerable, and so afford a ground for a peace that might compromise matters in dispute and still leave Russia her possessions—the other by conceding to the superior power of Great Britain and France all the positions which can make her dangerous, give up at once and for ever the ambitious designs which have animated the minds of the Russian Emperors during the last three hundred years.

The London *Guardian* of the 24th ult. concludes an editorial article upon the present position and prospects of the allies with the following observations:—

"To us the revelation of the true destination of the fleets has afforded unmixed satisfaction. We are relieved thereby from a very serious and very unpleasant apprehension. If military objects require the seizure of Odessa, or of any other place within the dominions of the Czar, by all means let it be seized

and occupied. But a wanton destruction of life and property—of unarmed men and private stores and houses—merely because a portion of the press clamours for it, and because we are told that the Russian Emperors would do the same to us if we only had the chance—would be a disgrace to the British name, and would bring discredit in the eyes of all reasonable men on the Government which allowed the outrage. We are glad to think that there is no danger of such a step being taken—that probably the Generals have not even entertained the intention ascribed to them. They seem, in fact, bent upon carrying on the war now in a more scientific and far less bloody manner than has been adopted hitherto. The operations at Kinburn had this character, and we trace it equally in the general line of proceedings since the evacuation of Sebastopol, at which an impatient public growler, but which to our mind exhibits strategic qualities not previously developed by the commanders. Everything indicates an intention on their part, without risking any general engagement, to draw the lost gradually around Prince Gortschakoff, and to force him to a hasty and disastrous retreat, or else to a capitulation. The possession of Kinburn will effectually prevent all water-communication between Oczakoff, Nicolaïff, and Kherson, and will thereby greatly hinder the transmission of stores from the western provinces. The operation of a considerable and constantly increasing force from Eupatoria upon the flank of the Russian General's communications with the mainland, will still more straiten and harass him; while the gradual advance of the French extreme right, which he seems quite unable to resist, threatens even to cut him off from one of the main bases of his operations, Simphoropol. Further movements are talked of, and are feasible, with the same object of isolating the Russian army. Although the force at Kinburn is not likely to watch (as we have seen suggested) a distance of a hundred miles over a waterless region to Perikop, and the 30,000 men disembarked, according to one telegraphic despatch, on the Kosi Tula, which is a barren and uninhabited tongue of sand some forty miles in length and two in width, must be set down as a bold stroke of imagination on the part of the telegrapher—it is probable enough that something will be done by the fleets and the accompanying land-force towards cutting off the communications between the mainland and the Crimean peninsula. Prince Gortschakoff means something when he says, "the allies contemplate a simultaneous advance from Bessarabia, Eupatoria, Kertch, and Kinburn." They contemplate, as we have said, drawing in closer the coils which they have woven around his army. When the "great establishment" commenced, according to Admiral Brunt, at Kinburn, is sufficiently advanced to be left to its own resources, it is likely that something may be attempted by the fleets and troops against Perikop. The troops may be landed at Kalan chak, or in the main bay of Perikop, under the protection of the gunboats and floating batteries, and may probably meet with no greater resistance than at Kertch, or Kinburn. Perikop, from its want of water, is incapable of maintaining more than a small garrison, and its reduction seems quite within the limits of possibility. On the other hand it is a misfortune that an advance may be made from Kertch, by sea to Gatch, and thence against the Tchernogor road, the only line of communication between the Crimea and Russia proper which has been hitherto uninterfered. Prince Gortschakoff's position is likely to become day by day more difficult, and even the winter, which may be expected shortly to intervene between him and his foes, can scarcely do more than delay his disembarkure.

Wind nations seem to be entertained in some quarters of great successes to be gained shortly on the Bug and Dnieper. The fall of Kinburn, and the evacuation and destruction of Oczakoff, are to lead immediately, we are told, to the seizure of Kherson and Nicolaïff. The Russian arsenals and dockyards at the latter place are to share the fate of those at Sebastopol, and if the Czar Alexander does not make the best use of his fleet, he is to be captured, and brought in triumph to London. Considering that the fleets have on board, at the highest estimate, no more than 10,000 soldiers, and that Nicolaïff and Kherson are both inland towns, well fortified and strongly garrisoned, we fear these expectations are doomed to bitter disappointment. Unless it should prove that the Bug and Dnieper have a depth of water very much beyond all known estimates, the gunboats alone would be able to approach the two cities. Without other supports than this it is absurd to suppose that the small force under General Sencer would advance twenty miles into the interior. The fact that so small a force has been sent indicates that no operations at a distance from the coast were intended; and the commencement of a "great establishment" at Kinburn proves that the real object is to seal up the passage through which alone vessels from Kherson and Nicolaïff can reach the sea, not to undertake anything against those places. Hereafter, possibly, the seat of war may be transferred from the Crimea to the mouth of the Bug and Dnieper; but as regards the Crimea itself demands the whole attention of the commanders, who show their wisdom in undertaking no expedition which has not a direct bearing on the Crimean contest."

The Colonial Secretary, Sir William Molesworth, died in London on the 22nd ult. There is plenty of speculation as to his successor, of whom nothing definite has yet appeared.

Parliament was prorogued on Thursday, 22nd October, to meet again on the 11th day of December.