

tion was formed the principal and most characteristic articles of which were "contrary to the spirit of constitutional government." It will be well for the Statesmen of British America, before taking any active steps towards a union of the Provinces, to ascertain if, since 1789, some progress has not been made in the science of Constitutional Government, as well as in all other sciences.

Before enquiring into a Federal Union of the North American Provinces, it may be well to look into the question of its practicability. To form a federal union upon the "American" model, each Provincial Legislature and Executive, as at present constituted, must be expected to degrade itself, in some degree, by yielding to the corresponding federal body, the possession of the supreme, internal power. If the union were proposed in this shape, to the several Legislatures, it is more than probable that one very serious obstacle would be started, at the outset. It is but natural that a man engaged voluntarily in any occupation, should feel a great repugnance to raising up another to preside over and direct him in carrying on that very occupation, whilst he himself is to take a step lower down. However consonant to reason such a course may be, under certain circumstances, it must be, in almost every case, extremely humiliating to the feelings. The individual supposed will, particularly if in difficulty, scarcely object to associating another with himself for successfully carrying on the occupation in question; but as for giving his place to another and occupying a subordinate position himself, such a step will scarcely be submitted to until he is driven to the last extremity. What is true with regard to an individual will also hold good with a regard to a collection of individuals, even where, as in the present case, it consists of a grave, deliberative, parliamentary assembly. The Legislature of Nova Scotia, for instance, may perceive nothing derogatory to its dignity, or hurtful to its feelings, in uniting, bodily and with powers unimpaired, with those of Canada and New Brunswick; but it is scarcely to be supposed that it will, without many internal throes, curtail its own powers and privileges for the purpose of raising up another legislative body similar, but superior, to itself.

But, presume that no such obstacles will be created by the Provincial Legislatures; and that the Federal Parliament and Federal Government are unanimously decided upon. What is to be the prerogative of that Government; and upon what objects is that Parliament to legislate? Of what powers can the several Provincial Legislatures divest themselves to bestow upon the Federal Legislature? It is presumed that each Province would expect to retain the entire control and management of its internal affairs. If it is not to do so, upon what principle can it, in one instance, retain the management of its own peculiar affairs, and, in others, yield such management to another, in this respect, concurrent authority? It is clear that, in this matter of the management of the internal affairs of each Province, there could be no division of authority amicably and satisfactorily agreed upon, in the first place; and if agreed upon at all, it could only lead to clashing of rival claims with no prospect of a generally beneficial result.

It will scarcely be contended, in any quarter, that a union involving an arrangement of this kind is either practicable, or desirable. If then the Federal Government is not to interfere with the proper, internal affairs of the separate Provinces; what shall be its powers and upon what objects shall it be exercised? We are here led to a view of the striking dissimilarity between the political condition and circumstances of the British North American Colonies and those of any confederation of States which has ever existed. The aim and object, in the formation of every such confederation, has been with reference to its *foreign* relations. With scarcely an exception, the authority of the Federal Government, in such unions, has been limited exclusively to the management of what, in political parlance, are called "foreign affairs;" and to the exercise of such powers as are indispensable to that management. The federal authorities, in the United States, have, according to the letter of the Constitution, a more extensive power of supervision over the individual States, and more numerous rights of interference in the internal affairs of the collective body, than have ever been entrusted to any other Federal Government. And what are