

the groups that supported the military takeover. Given the autonomy of the junta, it is to be expected that the regime will continue in a stable fashion over the coming years.

This continuity will stem from the following factors: First, the various contradictions that are little by little undermining the regime and accentuating the isolation of the junta are not yet sufficient to break the cohesiveness of the military. At the same time, no other group has the physical capacity to challenge successfully the armed forces' monopoly of power.

In the meantime, the junta will step up its ideological and organizational repression of the centre- and right-wing parties, which by supporting the army officers' initial war against the Chilean left helped set the stage for their own elimination. Fragments of these reactionary parties will be able to cling to life only with the complicity of certain sections of the army or through indirect protection by Washington. Some members of these élites (for example, Eduardo Frei) will continue their role of "voices in the night" until better days arrive.

Contrary to what many people outside Chile believe, the Church, which is the only national institution to have survived the coming of the military leviathan, is not now and never will be in the forefront of the struggle against the junta. As in the past, the Church hierarchy will continue to fight for human rights and, through its "national committee of solidarity", to oppose the most glaring kinds of physical and ideological repression. It will also continue to provide some protection and an ear for dissidents.

In spite of the economic repression, it is not inconceivable that the regime may find some new support among public service and university management and among certain sections of the sub-proletariat. After the real or imaginary convulsions that Chile lived through from 1970 to 1975, many social groups that dislike the junta's economic repression and monopoly of power are not ready to enter into a dangerous competition with the military in the next few years. Finally, the left is totally powerless within the country following the massive exile of its leadership and militant members, who have to be content with embarrassing the junta abroad, mobilizing opinion against its constant violation of human rights.

Any substantial change in the Chilean situation depends only indirectly on pressure from social groups inside the country or from the great powers. These internal

and external forces will have an effect on the junta's action, but not on its position as ruler of the state. Recognizing that only some deep fissure in the unity of the army would put the junta in real danger, and that such a break-up would have to have both internal and external causes, there are some hypothetical models for the future that may be applied to Chile. For example, the strongman tactics and style of General Pinochet could infect his peers or subordinates. Likewise, the staffs could oust their chiefs on the group that they are no longer following the general will of the army. In short, Pinochet could at any moment become the victim of a Viaux anti-Schneider move or a Pinochet anti-Prats move.

Models

Using the Argentinian military governments from 1970 to 1973 as a guide, we shall give the name "Livingstone-Lanusse scenario" to a succession model in which an army remains in power, but under unstable conditions, one faction displacing the other. In this model, the realization by the military that they are unable to solve the economic problems and are becoming increasingly unpopular sets the stage for a temporary return to civilian rule. In the case of Chile, there would have to be a steady deterioration of the economy and of relations with Washington in order for the Livingstone-Lanusse scenario to come about. Such a deterioration from within and without would encourage the "voices in the night" and provoke the open opposition of the professional associations, employer groups and trade unions. The final sequence in the scenario would see widespread squabbling among the officers, each taking the side of a bankrupt businessman, a ruined farmer, an insolvent shopkeeper, and executive reduced to proletarian status, or a stifled right-wing politician.

The return to civilian rule could follow the "Caramanlis scenario". Such a sequence of events guarantees, at one and the same time, democracy, institutional stability, the return of the military to their barracks and, above all, the exclusion from power of fascists, ultra-leftists and the Communist Party. This scenario is implicit in the present approach of the Chilean Democrat Party, which is now led by its right wing and hopes to return to power by promising a Chile without an Allende or a Pinochet. Frei Government No. . . . would bear little resemblance to Frei Government No. 1 with its "Revolution in Freedom". If we may be allowed to over-indulge in