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There would be nothing to object to in the above two steps if they were not marred by the possibility of the use of the right of veto by any one of the permanent members. This right of veto appears to create a feeling of uneasiness in certain quarters. The small countries are not unaware of the necessity or unmindful of the importance of maintaining the solidarity of the "Big Three" powers, which is in the last resort the greatest guaranty of peace.

It is in that spirit that they will no doubt sacrifice their legal scruples in respect of the application of sanctions to the superior interests of peace, and will be prepared in that connection to be resigned to--if not applaud--the exercise of the right of veto by the permanent members.

It will be more difficult for the small countries to acquiesce in the use of the veto by any one of the permanent members in respect of the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, or of any act of aggression.

This is a point on which the small countries will feel very strongly for reasons connected with the principles of international justice and morality.

They would bear with greater fortitude their disappointments and tribulations resulting from the non-application of sanctions in consequence of the use of the right of veto, if at least the Security Council could determine the existence of aggression and, implicitly, of the aggressor.

Is it not too much to ask a small country, victim of aggression, to forego the moral and legal satisfaction of knowing what is right and what is wrong, and who is the wrong-doer and who is the victim?

Let no one think the small countries' earnest desire in this connection is an unprofitable and purposeless claim. There is a very great deal in it which is of interest also to the great powers and would ultimately serve the best interests of peace. In this connection, less confusion and greater clarity are necessary, and they would have a restraining effect on the potential aggressor.

We venture to suggest a few alternative remedies to these drawbacks. The best course to take would be that the permanent members should, of their own accord, relinquish their right of veto in the determination of the existence of a breach of peace or of an act of aggression. This would make it possible for the Council "de dire le droit", a fundamental element of any charter of security worthy of that name.