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rise to constant difficulty leading to a progressive deterioration in Soviet-Polish relations. Polish troops were gathered together at points along the Volga but the Soviet government found itself unable to provide the Polish forces with arms and the Polish government had to apply to the United Kingdom for help in this connection. It was claimed that many months after the agreement was signed the Soviet authorities still held a large number of Polish citizens. At first the Soviet Government appeared to agree to the Polish interpretation that all residents of pre-war Poland were Polish citizens. Later this was modified to apply only to those residents of pre-war Poland who were of Polish race as distinct from Ukrainian, White Russian, Lithuanian or Jewish race. Finally the Soviet interpretation of Polish citizenship has been narrowed recently to residents of Poland exclusive of the areas occupied by Soviet forces in 1939. In the background of all these questions has been the frontier question which had been left open when the agreement was signed but on which neither side has been prepared to give way.

6. With a view to clearing up some of the difficulties and to inspect the Polish troops General Sikorski arrived in the Soviet Union early in December, 1941. He obtained from Stalin assurances that the release of all Polish citizens would be completed. Subsequent events, however, showed that these assurances did not bear much fruit. On December 4th, 1941, a joint declaration was signed pledging the two countries to co-operate in the rebuilding of Europe after the war. Even more publicity was given to an utterance by Stalin to the effect that after the war Poland would be strong and greater than before. Naturally this served to revive Polish hopes and in general the visit of General Sikorski was looked upon as a success. On the subject of the Polish forces it was agreed that nothing much more could be done under the circumstances.

Throughout the year 1942 the execution of the Soviet-Polish agreement gave rise to increasing difficulty. The Soviet Government after having expressed inability to equip the Polish forces with arms and equipment, commenced to find difficulty in providing these forces with food. This question was aggravated by the tendency of the Polish troops to share their rations with their families and relatives. It was this situation which led to the proposal that all the Polish forces should be evacuated to the Middle East in addition to the 25,000 men which the United Kingdom had asked for and which had early been agreed upon by the governments concerned. In the meantime the Polish troops and the Polish civilians had been concentrated in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. In the case of the troops this had been done partly because the barrack accommodation in the towns along the Volga had proved inadequate and partly because it was easier for the United Kingdom to distribute equipment to troops in Central Asia. In the case of the civilians it was thought that climatic conditions would be more favourable than in Siberia and the other districts to which the civilians had been sent. Actually the conditions in Central Asia proved to be very hard on the Poles owing to the severe heat in summer and the insufficiency of food.

8. The Soviet Government agreed very reluctantly to the evacuation of the Polish forces to the Middle East. Stalin appeared to feel it was a breach of the agreement and while he admitted that they could not provide the Polish forces with all the food they required he seemed to fear that it would be a reflection on the Soviet Government if it became known abroad that the Polish forces had to leave the Soviet Union owing to their inability to obtain sufficient food. The Polish contention was that they would be perfectly willing to have their forces remain and fight with the Red Army as envisaged by the agreement, if the Soviet Government for their part would carry out the agreement by providing the necessary arms, equipment and food. There was also the British contention that it was easier to bring the men to the arms than the arms to the men.

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