

1779.

in June serious purposes might have been attempted. His projected operations anticipating the early arrival of a reinforcement. He had opened the campaign three weeks before Washington expected it; had seized his short communication by King's Ferry with the Eastern Provinces; he must, to recover it, risk a general action, or he must retire behind the mountains to save Fort Defiance, &c., &c. He had reason to be jealous for West Point; though without a fleet and superior army it could not be attacked. Washington had retired behind the mountains where he was greatly distressed for supplies; there was little grass for the cavalry and carriage horses, and the roads were unrepaired. By the army afloat Washington's strong position at Middlebrook could have been got hold of by a rapid march when the troops were landed. Washington's choice of difficulties. For Clinton to move with only 6,000 men would have been absurd. A thousand men had been left to defend Stony Point and Verplanck; troops were collected from Rhode Island and expeditions sent to Connecticut to tempt Washington to march there, but he would not move from New Windsor. Had he done so Middlebrook could have been taken even with the small force he (Clinton) had, but it was fortunate that he did not as the delay in the arrival of the fleet would have given Washington an opportunity to collect troops enough to force the position and cut off all hopes of regaining that post. The delay caused by the affair at Stony Point. The reported movements of LaMotte Piquet obliged him (Clinton) to collect the army nearer King's Bridge. His negotiations with E. A. (Ethan Allen); the messenger sent with a letter had taken ill and despatched it by another, who brought an answer from A., that he would raise 4,000 men, attack the army under Clinton against the Indians, and that his magazines, &c., were ready. Recommends A. to fall back on Canada and coöperate with Haldimand, or join him (Clinton) if he thought it expedient, enroll men and name officers. The rumours seem to confirm the report of A.'s intentions. His distress for troops, but he sends Haldimand the reinforcement applied for. The danger to Georgia, unless South Carolina is reduced; a considerable force will be detached about the beginning of October. His force is not equal to the services required. Hopes the Indians from Canada will threaten the frontiers of Virginia. The late operations on Lake Champlain, &c., were well timed in favour of E. A. Page 85

September 9,  
New York.

Clinton to Haldimand. Introducing and recommending Colonel De Loos. 95

September 9,  
New York.

Same to the same, in cypher. 96  
Same to the same. His disappointment at not receiving the army of the convention, and of a reinforcement from the West Indies, but had sent three regiments, one British. Had they arrived he would, with recruits from Europe, have had more than he demanded, but the convoy under the "Renown" had been dispersed in a gale; the "Renown" had returned with seven companies of the 44th and part of the Lossbergs; the rest of the troops are still missing. The dangerous state of affairs in Georgia, unless South Carolina is reduced, for which purpose he would detach a considerable armament. Hopes the Indians will be prevailed on to threaten the frontiers of Virginia, which would operate in favour of the Southern movement, whilst a fleet would probably co-operate on the Chesapeake. (Has neither date nor signature, being the explanation of a letter in cypher. By comparison with letter (p. 85) dated 9th September, 1779, it will be seen that this letter is an abstract

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