

US in exchange for a Canadian purchase of 66 American F-101 fighter jets. During a meeting with Eisenhower in September, Diefenbaker strongly urged American acceptance of the deal. However, the US rejected it in December, suggesting instead that the F-101s be given to Canada in return for the Canadian takeover of the Pinetree radar network.

In contrast to these sometimes acrimonious debates, and in spite of irritants such as new US balance of payments regulations and the dominance of American periodicals in the Canadian market, economic relations with the US during 1960 were, on the whole, marked by a spirit of good will. Returning from the meeting of the Joint Canada-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, held in Washington in February, Finance Minister Donald Fleming reported on a “frank and friendly” discussion that was “the best and most constructive” (Document 314) of all such meetings he had attended. In no area was Canadian-American co-operation more evident than in the negotiations over the development of the Columbia River. Space limitations allow for the printing of only a small fraction of the voluminous archival records on this subject. The documents in this volume provide an overview of the key events leading to a breakthrough in the formerly deadlocked negotiations. In June, Minister of Justice E. Davie Fulton reported that “no insuperable problem” (Document 344) remained; in September, a progress report was released, outlining the key elements of the treaty signed in January 1961. However, though federal government negotiators in both countries were satisfied, the government of British Columbia remained “consistently suspicious” (Document 351) of Ottawa’s actions and intentions.

The Commonwealth remained a key area of Canadian concern during 1960. The prospect that the United Kingdom might join the European Economic Community was distinctly unwelcome to a Conservative government eager to maintain economic as well as emotional ties with the mother country. In June, Canadian officials requested “a firm assurance that the United Kingdom had not embarked on a changed policy and that there would continue to be very close consultation with Canada” (Document 389). After discussions between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in August, Ottawa was informed that a change in economic relations with Europe was being contemplated, since “[t]he United Kingdom must be economically strong if we are to be able to continue to play our full part in the economic development of the Commonwealth and in trying to maintain world stability.” The British intended to “start from the assumption that there is broad agreement among Commonwealth countries that it will be desirable for the United Kingdom to enter into a form of closer association with Europe provided that certain essential requirements can be met” (Document 391). Ottawa’s response was that “[t]he United Kingdom should not be left under any illusion that Canada could acquiesce in any arrangements which they make in Europe at the expense of Canada’s trade” (Document 392).

Along with this determination to preserve ties with the “Old Commonwealth” went an equally strong, if not stronger, resolve to maintain good relations with the