

*NATO—European Defence Community*

public opinion being behind many of these things, we ought to take time by the forelock and make sure that as far as this parliament is concerned there is no jot or tittle of evidence with respect to these agreements that is not made abundantly clear to the Canadian people as a whole. I think that ought to commend itself as a policy to every member of the House of Commons.

In making that suggestion I believe we ought to remember the mistakes that we have made in the past, and we ought to benefit by those mistakes and go forward in the new era with a new procedure in these international matters. It has always occurred to me that in the house we give great attention to and focus great concern on many domestic matters, but on questions of international gatherings we do not show the same concern. Make no mistake about it, there are over 100 conferences to which Canadians go. There are many matters discussed in these conferences and decisions arrived at by the representatives of this country which hardly ever see the light of day except to those in the parliament of Canada who may be interested in these technical international topics.

I think the time has come when in view of the major part that Canada is taking in international affairs parliament and the people of Canada must be given a freer and fuller and more abundant opportunity of seeing exactly what we are doing in every phase of world activity today. That I think is something that we ought to consider at this time as being important.

I wish now, if I may, to deal with the protocol and its relevant circumstances. I was interested in the minister's approach to the problem and the issues which this protocol arouses. In the main I think I can say that we agree with most of the comments and observations which he made. In taking our position, or in assessing the position that Canada should take on the NATO protocol, I think we have to consider that there are some lessons that we may learn from similar events that have occurred in other parts of the globe.

I am satisfied that any evidence of hesitancy, any suggestion of delay, anything that looks as though this country or the free powers were taking a little more time in some of these deliberations than normally might be the case, always impresses those who are looking for chinks in our armour and a sense of indifference on the part of the free front. I have no doubt in my mind that we would not have had a crossing of the 38th parallel in Korea had those behind the iron and bamboo curtains been told in no uncertain

terms that if that crossing was made or if aggression of that kind occurred there would be a certain rallying of the free powers to see that it was stopped. But instead of that there was hesitancy, there was uncertainty, there was a somewhat chaotic approach to that particular section of the Orient. It was an invitation which was accepted by the Soviet and those who were under its direct or indirect control to take the step that they did.

I have always looked upon the Berlin blockade as being a test set up by the Soviet to find out whether we were united to the extent that we said we were. I have always felt that if we had not met that test as we did, if we had not called the bluff of the Soviet in Berlin, we would be faced with almost chaotic, if not dangerous, conditions in Europe far beyond the conditions which we now face, dangerous though they may be.

I think those are lessons that we in this parliament should consider because they will go a long way to educating us as to how we must deal with the people in the Kremlin who have control of Soviet policy. I have had a humble experience, but it has been broadening, in attending international conferences from time to time. I have formed the inevitable conclusion, which I think I must apply to the present protocol, that the Soviet is not really anxious for agreement, that it is not really anxious for the settlement of issues because any agreement and any settlement means that imperial communism cannot thrive or grow to best advantage. It thrives and has its most fertile ground in those conditions where people cannot reach agreement, where people are differing in their view, where there is uncertainty and chaos.

I have felt, and I think many of those who have attended international conferences have felt, that after all the Soviet is taking the position which perhaps it is expected it would, that if the people do not think that it pays them to settle, then it is pretty hard to get them into an agreement of any kind. The most difficult person with whom to form an agreement is the man who thinks it would not pay him to make an agreement. I think this is at the root of much of the western difficulty with the Soviet in the effort to settle international disputes generally.

If we are going to continue the discussions which started some years ago, when an attempt was made, and a very earnest attempt, by the western powers to arrive at a peace treaty for a unified Germany, I would remind the house that while the Soviet talks long and loud about the desirability of having another big four conference, those of us—I fancy this would include most members of the house—

[Mr. Graydon.]