

Other member states have not yet learned how to deal with this, and the US gets much of what it wants in the Security Council. The world is very fortunate to have as the dominant power a nation loath to unleash its military might. However, the situation of unchallenged U.S. dominance of the Council bodes ill for the UN, *inter alia* given the sometimes chaotic policy development process in Washington. Other Member States need to develop the means to influence American policy at the UN to a greater extent than is the case at present.

The paramount concern for the foreseeable future is funding, particularly **American contributions**. The familiar and tiresome kabuki performances staged by successive American administrations over congressional responsibility for U.S. delays in the funding of international development are now being re-staged with the set shifted to UN financing. The international community as a whole needs to ensure, in a manner that it recently has not, that the Administration gets serious with Congress on this question. It must also prepare itself to shoulder a larger share of the financial burden relative to the United States.

The US has spearheaded calls for administrative and management **reform of the United Nations**, supported in varying degrees by several other Member States, mostly notably G-7 partners. A number of specific US reform objectives (e.g. the creation of an Inspector General function at the UN) have now been met, but Washington remains dissatisfied and has signalled that it will veto a second term for Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali citing his record in this area. Under pressure mainly from TCNs, considerable reform has been achieved in the Security Council's working methods, aimed at greater transparency in decision-making and openness to the views of non-Council members.²⁹ Expansion of Security Council membership has been advocated by many NAM delegations and by several States with credible claims to permanent member status. However, consultations on this issue perennially tantalizing for practitioners and academics alike are largely deadlocked, if only because NAM members have experienced difficulty in reaching agreement on which among them should aspire to permanent membership of the Council.

Some UN players in New York are talking increasingly of a '**big bang**' reform package covering financing, Security Council composition and reform of the UN development agencies. Alas, given the UN's corporate culture of '*muddling through*', any serious reform may first require a '**big bang**' financial crisis to focus high-level attention on the problems.

Some concern has arisen in recent years over the candour of the **military advice** to the Council by the Secretariat. Mr. Boutros-Ghali, although commendably more independent and notoriously more blunt than several of his predecessors, may not always have provided to the full Council his best advice. The *modus operandi* in New York in the drafting of a report from the Secretary-General to stimulate Council decisions on a given problem, is to take the pulse of the P-5 and establish the parameters of

²⁹ For an outline of the many procedural innovations in Council operations over the past three years, see UN document A/AC.247/1996/CRP.4 of April 16, 1996.