

the opponents' arguments. To what extent is the United States still relying on its traditional alliances as opposed to multipolar balancing? How great are the opportunities for unilateral gain by the USSR in Europe? Are Washington, Peking, and Tokyo moving toward a triple entente in Asia? How large is the opening for economic and technological collaboration with the West? How important are agreements in this area, and what political price might the Soviet Union properly pay for them? On these and many other interrelated questions of importance to the determination of Moscow's conduct in Europe there are no clear answers for the Soviets, much less for the Western analyst of Soviet calculations. Nevertheless it is possible to fit various bits of evidence on Soviet perceptions and judgments into a larger framework of situational factors that may serve to influence Moscow's actions in a reform direction at the CSCE and in the subsequent period.

Military security has traditionally been an overriding concern of Soviet policy-makers. The current situation is quite novel in that the USSR has achieved an unparalleled invulnerability to attack. As the result of a massive build-up in its strategic nuclear forces, it has now achieved a position that is broadly described as "parity" with the United States. Both sides may be expected to continue developing their strategic capabilities, emphasizing qualitative