

mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. ...

...[T]hese confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air-space.¹¹ They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area and air-space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating states there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations."

The specific CSBM proposals to be considered at Stockholm includes many of those suggested at Madrid. The December 12, 1980, Proposal submitted by Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, for instance, contains a number of possible candidates. They include some obvious extensions to and revisions of Helsinki CBMs, such as a reduced floor of 18,000 men for manoeuvre notification (including aggregated manoeuvres); extended notification time (30 days); increased information about the manoeuvres; and guidelines for the exchange of observers and their proper treatment. The proposal also called for 30-day pre-notification of major military movements in excess of 18,000 men (including aggregated movements of smaller groups); 30-day (or more) pre-notification of naval exercises involving more than 5000 amphibious troops and/or

10 major amphibious warfare vessels; prior notification of major naval exercises; and openness with regard to information concerning military expenditures. Other possibilities include restrictions on force movements in "high tension" areas (the inter-German border region, for instance); the use of observers at fixed entry and exit points to monitor troop rotations in garrison areas; and the exchange of increased information about equipment and personnel. Several of these measures have already been suggested at the MBFR negotiations where they are called Associated Measures. These and other potential Confidence and Security Building Measures will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

The CSCE process has been, at best, only modestly successful to this point. However, it has survived – if barely – badly deteriorated East-West political relations, to give birth to the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is clearly too early to tell at this stage whether the CCSBMDE will lead to the adoption of meaningful Confidence-Bulding Measures or whether it will become just another victim of the larger animosities of Soviet-American relations. It seems unlikely that anything positive will emerge from the CCSBMDE process *unless* the general atmosphere of East-West relations improves. However, it is not inconceivable that a degree of good will and effort exhibited within the Stockholm conference itself might appreciably improve the general state of East-West relations.



¹¹ The text of the Final Document contains the following note: "In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe." The note is designed to temporarily "solve" the problem of an offsetting extension of the CBM zone. The Soviet use of the term "ocean area" was originally intended to include, at least potentially, vast areas of the Atlantic Ocean. The joint presence of this term and the implicitly more restrictive term "sea area" preferred by the West will have to be clarified at Stockholm.

