

That paragraph provides: "During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the mandate, the mandatory power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces."

I would suggest to the Committee, however, that there is no real practical difficulty here, because if the mandate were not terminated, and if, by some chance, the armed forces and the civil administration of the mandatory had been withdrawn from an area, how could the mandatory, how could the Government of the United Kingdom discharge full responsibility in any more than a legal sense? I think, therefore, that we were correct in assuming that the mandate would be terminated before any area was completely evacuated by the mandatory power.

After termination of the mandate, none of these difficulties arise, because the responsibility for administration is shared between the mandatory and the Commission as the former progressively withdraws and the latter takes over.

The representative of Syria, speaking this afternoon, said that the work of our Sub-committee was difficult. He was right. It *was* difficult. He said it was difficult because we were trying, in that Sub-committee, to convert wrong into right, and injustice into justice. In saying that, I think he did the members of the Sub-committee less than justice. It was not that. We were quite aware in the Sub-committee, of the difficulties of the position, the legal difficulties, the moral difficulties, and the physical difficulties. What we were trying to do in that Sub-committee was to carry out a duty, imposed on us by the full Committee, to draw up the most practicable solution possible for the partition of Palestine, and to try to work out a plan which would provide for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power from the mandatory to the people of Palestine.

Well, that is a difficult problem for anyone to solve. It was a difficult problem for Sub-committee II to solve. The representative of Pakistan, in answer to my first question, said this afternoon, when I asked him whether the members of Sub-committee II were certain that there could be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power from the mandatory to the people of Palestine, on the basis of their recommendations, said that this would depend, of course, on how the people of Palestine reached to their recommendations, how they accepted the recommendations, and how they would co-operate in working them out. That applies also to our Report. We also recommend solutions, in the hope that the people of Palestine will cooperate in working them out. The answer the delegate from Pakistan gave to me to that question would be exactly the same as the answer I should give to the representative of Iraq when he asks us on Sub-committee I the same question.

The representative of New Zealand this afternoon told us that, while he was in favour of partition in principle, nevertheless, since there is nothing in our Report to provide for effective implementation or enforcement, unless that Report were amended to make such provision, his government would be unable to support it. He said that it was weak; he said that he wanted some amendments to make the Report strong—strong practically, as well as legally strong.