

only that arms should be put into their hands to render them available for the defence of the country.

That these matters have long secured the attention of the officers of the Volunteer Force of Canada, is proved by the following extract from a memorial presented to the Minister of Militia in June, 1868, and which was signed by fifty-nine field officers belonging to the Force in Ontario:—

"That the efficiency of the Force, taking into consideration the elements given by the present volunteer organization, would be promoted by constituting the volunteers the 'Regular Militia,' retaining all effective corps as representing the Militia of their respective counties, and applying to them the provisions of the existing Militia Law respecting the contemplated Regular and Reserve Militia, subject to such modifications as the circumstances of each case, local or otherwise, might require.

"Your memorialists respectfully submit that by these means would be gained:

"*First*.—The element of stability contemplated by the organization of the Regular Militia.

"*Second*.—That of simplicity, in having only one organization to deal with; and which would be capable of being extended so as to embrace the whole military resources of the country.

"*Third*.—That with the existence of the power of drafting (or balloting) in case of necessity, there would not be much difficulty in maintaining the Force on almost a purely voluntary basis."

The latter clause, though somewhat obscurely worded, implies that once the duty of bearing arms is recognised by the community as one in which there can be no avoidance, there would be no lack of volunteers. The objections of employers of labour could no longer impose a check on the military ardour of our young men; and the knowledge of impending ballot would lead those reluctant to serve to act as recruiting sergeants, to keep companies and regiments full, in order that they themselves might avoid compulsory service.

The memorialists, in order to provide for the increased expenditure necessary for the support of an efficient Force, recommend that an annual tax for Militia purposes shall be levied from each man "liable for duty, but not actually serving in the Militia."

Upon these principles, based on the expressed opinions of statesmen, and of practical men who have long made the subject their study, I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction, that in the establishment of the Militia alone rests our opportunity for securing a sufficient, efficient, and satisfactory military organization in Canada.

The position I assume is, therefore, as follows:—

The people of Canada contribute annually a large sum for the maintenance of the National Defence. This sum is supposed to train, every three years, 40,000 men, so that in case of need they may be found efficient soldiers. I maintain, therefore, that the country has a right to expect, that at the expiration of every three years, 40,000 men shall be added to the Militia Reserve of the country; that these 40,000 men shall be qualified for military service if required; and that sufficient organization shall be retained amongst them to enable their assemblage at short notice. Under these conditions the country might be considered to have received a fair equivalent for its larger annual expenditure.

What is necessary, then, to achieve this end? So far as relates to the Militia Law, it is so essentially an elastic and permissive

one, that little requires to be changed save in doing away with the word "Volunteer;" to abolish the inequality of service which exists between the "volunteer" and "regular" Militia; to strike out the clause giving the privilege of leaving a corps on six months' notice, and that relating to the pay of officers; and the bill will then cover all the real requirements of the service. It would be further required to perfect the machinery for the completion of corps by the ballot; and the men having been thus obtained; the material for the structure of organization complete, the remainder is simply a matter of detail.

Taking the quota, as required by law, of 40,000 Militia, (who would form the first class, or "Service Militia,") as a basis for organization, I beg to offer, for your information, a few figures regarding the due proportion of the various arms into which they should be divided. For economical reasons, these proportions have been neglected hitherto; but as the organization tends towards perfection, it is necessary that the ordinary rule laid down for the Imperial service should be observed. Whilst we had garrisons of Her Majesty's troops, and a large proportion of field artillery amongst them, shifts could be made to furnish an army with its quota of cavalry and artillery; but now that we are thrown on our own resources, the existing deficiencies must be supplied.

The distribution that at present exists is as follows:—

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|---------------------------------------|--------|
| Cavalry, 27 Troops, nominal strength, | 1,666 |
| Field Batteries, 10 (42 gun-) do | 750 |
| Garrison Artillery, 70 Batteries, do | 4,108 |
| Engineers, 4 Companies, do | 232 |
| Infantry and Rifles, 623 Cos., do | 36,729 |
| Naval, 3 Companies, do | 174 |
| Total | 43,659 |

Taking the rules laid down in the Imperial service, the proportions should be as follows:—

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| Cavalry.—Hussars, 39 Troops, 2,271 officers and men | 2,271 |
| 46 Troops, 2,702 officers and men... | 4,973 |
| Field Batteries, 17 (68 guns), or one gun to 600 men | 1,700 |
| Garrison Batteries; 50 | 5,000 |
| Engineers, 17 Companies | 1,700 |
| Infantry, Rifles and Marine Companies | 26,627 |
| Total | 40,000 |

This distribution is based upon the assumption that cavalry should be in the proportion of one-fifth of the infantry; artillery one gun to 600 men; garrison artillery, sufficient to man the walls of our defensible fortifications: two engineer companies to each district (or division in the field); and the balance, infantry and rifles.

To secure this proportion few changes are necessary. Retaining the 22 troops of Hussars at present organized, the addition of 17 troops would give each district from one to three squadrons, and troops of mounted rifles could be easily formed from existing infantry companies. Considering how easily this could be effected, and the natural disposition of the better class of young men in rural districts to prefer the mounted service, the suitability of Canadian horses for such work, and the immense value of mounted rifles in modern warfare, it is singular that this force has not been encouraged hitherto. According to regulation, these troops should consist of 55 officers and men.

The seven field batteries required should be raised by demi-batteries or divisions in rural districts. Hitherto they have been

confined to cities or larger towns, where it is difficult to procure horses, men suited for the heavy work of gunners, of sufficiently good horsemen for drivers. The location of a division or demi battery in a thriving village, the centre of a well-populated rural district, would prove a great stimulus to enlistment in the immediate vicinity, and be a matter of pride to the whole neighbourhood. The batteries would, of course, be united on proceeding into the brigade camps.

As our existing garrison batteries may be said to be infantry in artillery uniform, the 20 batteries existing over the quota required is not a question that needs consideration. It would be well, however, if in the future the duties and uniform should be made to correspond.

The formation of the 13 engineer companies, I look upon as a necessity. Their peculiar duties can be performed by no other arm; and in a country like our own, interlaced with railroads, dissected by unfordable streams, and abounding in defensible positions, the organized force of skilled artisans is indispensable. True, we have them in our ranks; but of what use is a workman without his tools; and though a Canadian woodsman can build a house with his axe and jack-knife, he could scarcely repair an engine, or mine a bridge with his bayonet. With them also, would rest the provision of intrenching tools for the use of the army, and the construction of the "Field Telegraph," so universally used in modern warfare. The establishment provided by the Act is insufficient; I have, therefore, fixed the strength of the companies at 100 officers and men, as in the Imperial service.

To effect these changes without materially interfering with the present battalion organization would be the desideratum. As, however, there are 78 independent companies, ranging from two to thirty two in the several military districts—many battalions having an uneven number of companies; many infantry and rifle companies anxious to change into mounted corps; and many, doubtless, who would be eager to join the field artillery—these matters only need careful consideration, judicious management, and a rigid apportionment of each arm to the several districts in equal proportions, to obviate all the difficulties that could arise in carrying out the required alterations.

The next and most important question is that of expense. Cavalry equipment costs eight times that of infantry. Saddlery is the chief item. Now, in making the suggestion I am about to make, I do not for one moment suppose the McClellan saddle is in any respect equal to our own, but they are serviceable, they are cheap, and they are easily manufactured and repaired. Why not buy these for our mounted rifles? They can be obtained, in quantities, for from \$3 to \$5 each, and by substituting a decent looking stirrup, and some slight alterations in the mode of placing the blankets, they would neither injure the horse's back nor the seat of the rider. A mounted rifleman, armed with a good rifle and revolvers; his McClellan saddle judiciously arranged; a stout halter bridle, with Pelham bit, reins strong enough to be used for picking or tying; his trousers tucked into serviceable knee boots, with hunting spurs strapped on, would, if rough-looking, prove a formidable enemy and a serviceable friend. His errand being to march on horseback and fight on foot, he should be encumbered with no useless trappings (sabres, for instance); his uniform should be of the plainest, and his accoutre-