

no other control over civil corporations but that which parliament could exercise itself. It would then be necessary for parliament to become a court of justice in order to inquire into the nature of facts and pronounce upon them. Corporations would no longer be subject to the visitations of the King, which are made through the medium of tribunals; they would become privileged bodies, having the facility to infringe more or less and more than less their charter and it would be most difficult to reach them and punish them.

We may well say that the doctrine emitted by the minister of justice seems to us contrary to the sound interpretation which should be given of the constitution by which we are ruled, and if there could really exist a doubt on the matter, parliament should examine the question and immediately prepare a remedy for the annoyances and dangers of such a doctrine.

II.

In the second place, Sir Campbell reproaches the petitioner for not having urged in his petition that he had suffered by the infractions of which the Bank is accused. It is a very queer reproach, and without attaching more importance than it is necessary to that point, we will say that the petitioner proves in his petition that both the public and himself have suffered by the acts of which the Bank is accused. True it is a fact that the plaintiff is a shareholder in the capital stock, but it is not as such that he complains, nor is it as such that he could and had a right to complain. He alleges that the Bank has been prejudicial to the public in general, by the violation of its charter and that he, as a private individual, has suffered by those violations. The Bank has charged him usurious interests; it has entered in competition with him in the manufacturing and commerce of shoes; it has increased his responsibility as shareholder, in monopolizing the shares of his capital to the amount of \$43,600, etc. The plaintiff was therefore perfectly right to complain as he has done.