

tion with Great Britain by her fleets, and, as it were, the seaport of Canada, Quebec is undoubtedly the true base of operations for carrying on war in Canada, and therefore, as the Government of Canada must cooperate in war with the Home Government, it is there that it should establish itself immediately on the outbreak of hostilities.

Notwithstanding all that has been said as to the possibility of a campaign in front of Quebec during the winter months, all those who know the country, and have experience of its climate and the effects of frost in hardening the ground, will feel perfect confidence that, although hostilities may be continued for a month or six weeks after the close of the navigation, during which the defence of Quebec might be left to its own unaided resources, the attack of a fortress in winter is almost an impossibility; and the utmost that could be done, even if the army could keep the field, would be to blockade it, with the hope of reducing it by starvation—which, considering the facilities for keeping stores in winter, could only be the result of gross neglect on the part of the defenders. Quebec, therefore, with the support of the fleet in summer, and of its rigorous climate in winter, furnishes many of the conditions requisite for a secure base of operations. It has, however, a great defect, in consequence of its distance from the shores of the Atlantic, and the difficulty of keeping up a communication between it and Great Britain during the