the same time he is not under obligation to communicate or even to indicate any one of the grounds upon which it is founded." Lord Blackburn at p. 87 says the same thing in somewhat different words: "As it seems to me the plain reason and sense of the thing is that, as soon as you say that the particular premises are privileged and protected, it follows that the mere opinion and belief of the party from those premises should be privileged and protected also." And still more concisely at p. 93, Lord Bramwell says: "It appears to me upon the reason and principle of the thing, that a man ought not to be called upon to state what his belief is, founded upon information, which information is privileged, and which he is not bound to disclose."

CHEQUE—NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

The next case, *McLean* v. *The Clydesdale Banking Co.*, p. 95, may be noted as an authority in the court of last resort, on a point, which is, however, spoken of by their Lordships as well established, viz., that a banker's draft or cheque is substantially a bill of exchange, attended with many, though not all, the privileges of such, and is a negotiable instrument; and consequently the holder, to whom the property in it has been transferred for value, either by delivery or by indorsation, is entitled to sue upon it, if, upon due presentation, it is not paid. A cheque, says Lord Blackburn, at p. 106, is "an unconditional order in writing addressed to a banker, requiring him to pay a sum certain in money at a fixed or determinable future time, that is to say, on presentation;" and so comes within the definition of a bill of exchange.

B. N. A. ACT—POWER OF LOCAL LEGISLATURES.

The remaining cases which it is necessary to note from this number of appeal cases, are Canadian appeals. The first is the celebrated *Hodge* v. *The Queen*, which has already been so much commented on. The head-note commences with the statement that "subjects which, in one aspect and for one purpose, fall within sec. 92 of the B. N. A. Act, may, in another aspect and for another purpose, fall within sec. 91." Their Lordships observe, at p. 130, that this is the principle which *Russell* v. *The Queen*, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 829, and *Citizens' Ins. Co.* v. *Parsons*, *Ib.* p. 96, also illustrate. In *Hodge* v. *The Queen*, the points decided would appear to be these. The first is expressed at p. 131, thus: "Their Lordships consider that the powers intended to be conferred by the Act in question (the Liquor License Act of 1877, R. S. O. c. 181), when properly understood, are to make regulations in the nature of police and municipal regulations of a merely local character for the good government of taverns, etc., licensed for the sale of liquors by retail, and such as are calculated to preserve, in the municipality, peace and public decency, and repress drunkenness and disorderly and riotous conduct. As such, they cannot be said to interfere with the general regulation of trade and commerce which belongs to the Dominion Parliament, and do not conflict with the provisions of the Canada Temperance Act, which does not appear to have as yet been locally adopted. The subjects of legislation in the Ontario Act of 1877, secs. 4 and 5, seem to come within the heads Nos. 8, 15 and 16 of sec. 92 of the B. N. A. Act." The second point decided is to be found at p. 132: "Provincial Legislatures are in no sense delegates of, or acting under, any mandate from the Imperial Parliament. When the B. N. A. Act enacted that there should be a Legislature for Ontario, and that its Legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for this Province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in sec. 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by