

On the basis of the resolutions before the Committee the principle issue we face at this time is the composition of the Political Conference. My Delegation's approach to this problem is a practical one. I agree with Mr. Schumann, who advised us yesterday not to put too literal an interpretation upon Paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement. That document is a recommendation of the military commanders to their respective sides. When Paragraph 60 was first discussed, Admiral Joy made the following statement for the record concerning the United Nations Command's understanding of this proposal:

"First", he said, "we desire to point out that this recommendation will be made by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the United Nations as well as to the Republic of Korea."

So far as my Delegation is concerned, therefore, our understanding of the position is as stated by Admiral Joy on behalf of the United Nations Command, that our "side" in this conflict is the United Nations itself. The central problem before us is the question of which countries should participate in the Political Conference. The resolution we have co-sponsored makes it clear that we feel that each member of the United Nations who has contributed forces to the Unified Command has earned its right to a place at the Conference table, should its government wish to exercise that right

Our objective is to make sure - and how we do this is not the important point - that we get to the Conference those countries who should be there if the Conference is to have its best chance of achieving successful results in terms of the future peace and security of the area. As a matter of convenience we are proposing to do this by means of three resolutions rather than one.

So far as my Delegation is concerned, we do not so much care whether you call it a round table or a cross table conference or a polygonal conference; the important thing is to get those who must be there around a table. The composition of the Conference is all the more important, in our view, because we now have, it seems to me, a unique opportunity not only for settling an issue which for the past three years has threatened at any moment to touch off a general conflagration, but for reducing, as a direct consequence of any success in Korea, dangerous tensions in Asia and other parts of the world.

It goes without saying, therefore, that my Government thinks the U.S.S.R. should participate in the Political Conference because it would be quite unrealistic to hold a conference such as we have in mind without the Soviet Union which should take her full share of responsibility not only for peace-making but for peace-keeping.

My Government also believes that the great and growing importance of India in Asian affairs and the leading role which she has played in and out of this Assembly in efforts of conciliation, which have greatly facilitated the achievement of the armistice we are now celebrating, entitle her to participate in the Political Conference. I have no doubt that others were impressed, as I was, by the restraint of Mr. Nehru's statement reported in the press yesterday. As I understand the position, India, far from seeking to participate in the Conference, would only be willing to serve if the major parties concerned desire her assistance and if it is clear that she can perform some useful function in the interests of peace.