

The Moscow summit, June 3-5, 2000, agreed on principles of strategic stability, *inter alia*: the need to maintain strategic nuclear stability; to strengthen strategic stability and international security, while preserving deterrence; the full ratification of START II; intensified discussion on further reductions in strategic forces within the framework of a future START III, and on ABM issues, in accordance with the Moscow and Cologne statements of 1998 and 1999, respectively; the essential contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive forces, and as a cornerstone of strategic stability; agreement on combating the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, through existing and possible new international legal mechanisms, while recognizing that this new threat represented a potentially significant change in the strategic situation and international security environment; and that issues of strategic offensive arms could not be considered in isolation from issues of strategic defensive arms and vice versa – an interrelationship that is reflected in the ABM Treaty and aimed to ensure equally the security of the two countries.

At the Okinawa G-8 meeting, July 21-23, 2000, the two presidents signed a joint statement on cooperation on strategic stability that included a search for new ways of cooperation to control the spread of missiles and missile technology – including a new mechanism to supplement the Missile Technology Control Regime; creating, and placing into operation within the year, a joint US-Russia center for exchange of data from early warning systems and notification of missile and space vehicle launches, and on principles for opening this system to the voluntary participation of all interested countries; and call upon the other G-8 states and all other nations of the world to unite in their efforts to strengthen strategic stability.

A US-Russia strategic stability cooperation initiative was agreed on September 6, 2000, at the UN Millennium Summit, that included an "implementation plan" that covered on-going and future cooperation on theatre missile defence testing, missile non-proliferation, CTBT verification, and progress on a shared early-warning centre and a bilateral ballistic missile pre-launch notification agreement.

This listing of agreements and understandings between the Russian Federation and the United States reflected a clear convergence of views on aspects of strategic stability, the means to achieve it, despite the two sides having asymmetric views on the utility of missile defences. To a certain extent, it was obvious that Russia had modified its position to concur with the US on the new dangers of WMD and missile proliferation, on the potential utility of limited theatre missile defences (restricted in a manner as not to impinge on the provisions of the ABM), on securing and disposition of surplus weapon-usable fissile material, on accepting US financial assistance (with some physical intrusiveness) to dismantle nuclear and chemical weapon systems and ballistic missiles, and on transparency and irreversibility measures for nuclear reductions. On the other hand, the United States exercised restraint in moving forward on theatre and national missile defence while attempting to remain within the strictures of the ABM, provided Nunn-Lugar funding for cooperative threat reduction, proposed a joint early warning data exchange centre, agreed to Y2K cooperation, and pressured Russia to improve export controls and to cease and desist from nuclear and missile exports.

Thus, despite major differences between Washington and Moscow on issues such as NATO expansion, use of force in Kosovo and against Iraq, continuing provocative surveillance operations by the US Navy and Air Force against Russia, CTBT ratification, and on missile defences, the two sides had in fact reached a modicum of agreement on strategic stability based on the principles of openness and transparency, irreversibility, predictability, cooperative threat reduction and further reductions in strategic offensive forces.