

difficult to move from political agreements to practical implementation (for example, in the case of the Argentina-Brazil nuclear transparency and non-proliferation accords).

Implications for the Multilateral Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Agenda

These case studies taken together underline some of the difficulties of exporting or translating the fundamental concepts of the Western non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament experience to different regional contexts. If one looks at this in simple terms, many of these difficulties are tied to different definitions of "national interests" -- if not losing face or making deals with former colonial powers is more important than reaching a security-building agreement, this is *by definition* how interests are defined. Yet behind this simple (and rationalist) vision lies the deeper cultural content: it is precisely the different impact of "cultural sources" (diplomatic, political or strategic) that leads to definitions of national interests that pose problems for the easy translation of Western NACD concepts.

These studies also put into stark relief the distinctiveness of the East-West (or more generally Western) experience with NACD issues, and illuminate some of the cultural underpinnings of those developments. Stepping back from the East-West experience, one can see that arms control (and the development of an NACD agenda in general) was part of a tightly-knit conceptual package, a technocratic, step-by-step, and status-quo oriented approach to managing the superpower confrontation and to guaranteeing minimal stability in a nuclear world. It was also relatively successful in achieving its goals, albeit with an enormous amount of effort and resources. But the studies above suggest that in most, if not all, cases significant obstacles, some of which can be called "cultural," stand in the way of easy acceptance of the basic parameters of the NACD agenda when these are exported beyond Western or Northern frontiers. As a perhaps rather negative observation, it would be a mistake to assume that the near future will witness the easy unfolding of wholehearted multilateral security cooperation, at least in such regions as Latin America, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and perhaps Africa.

This can be illustrated with various examples of specific concepts current in Western NACD vocabulary and practice. Ideas such as openness and transparency, for example, are regarded in most other regions as completely alien -- and not just because of conventional ideas of military secrecy, but because there is no "fulcrum" to set against military secrecy as leverage that could be used by other political actors. There are, in other words, few domestic political traditions in which the idea of transparency could resonate as a positive social and political goal, to be set against the security need for some level of secrecy.²⁵ In some cases (such as the South Korean) where there has been a certain acceptance of the need for verification and transparency, one can argue that these ideas have been accepted as part of a broader process of incorporation into Western security structures, and in response to perceived regional threats.²⁶

²⁵ It should also be noted, of course, that few other states approach the American level of domestic transparency (via, for example, Freedom of (or Access to) Information legislation).

²⁶ One could attribute this evolution of the South Korean security culture to a number of factors: its close alliance with the United States, its need for information concerning North Korea, its process of democratization, or the fact that it is not really a "Confucian" culture. Obviously, further work would be needed to untangle these threads. I am indebted to Alan Crawford for this example.