

2. Regional tensions -- both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli -- inhibited the resolution of Lebanon's problems. Plans tended to oscillate between two extremes and to reflect the power of the ascendant actor outside Lebanon. This was particularly evident in the period 1982 to 1989. The May 17th Agreement represented the Israeli option while the Tripartite Agreement was evidence of the Syrian option. Corm stressed that the arbitrator of an agreement should be separate from the parties to the agreement. He noted that in the past, actors have been both party to and judges of an agreement.
3. Issam Naaman noted that the various reform plans always had to perform a double function: to change the sectarian system and to end the war. "Unfortunately, the requirements of stopping the war have always been the pacesetter for internal reform."
4. As the conflict continued, the number of actors grew, making agreement on a common denominator very difficult.
5. While violence dramatically increased the need for reform, it also heightened sectarian consciousness, which negatively affected both the ability to implement reforms and peace plans.
6. Actors who were involved in implementing settlements generally favoured either security provisions or political reforms - but not both. This contributed to the failure of the agreements since the two are integrally linked. Workshop participants acknowledged that agreements favouring political reform, such as secularization, could minimize regional influences.
7. Peace settlements were generally piecemeal rather than comprehensive, a characteristic that contributed to their downfall.