

There is always the danger, however, that as higher political organs are drawn into such deliberations, the formal finding of a violation will have political consequences which could lead some states to seek and others to avoid such discussions. The Board of Governors ultimately exercises the Agency's powers to investigate anomalies, and to make a finding of non-compliance. The combination of legal, political and technical considerations that would lie behind such a finding would affect the interpretation by specific states placed on statements by the Board. Commenting on the implications of political shifts in the Board, Fischer and Szasz note:

*If the need should ever arise it might become increasingly difficult to obtain a finding of non-compliance against a member of a large bloc — or too easy to do so in the case of an isolated, unpopular country.<sup>8</sup>*

Such a risk, however, should not be overstated, in their opinion. In this context, there have been suggestions that such findings should be treated as technical matters and relegated to a lower, presumably more technical, level of the Agency.<sup>9</sup> The benefits and feasibility of this may be doubtful, however. On technical grounds alone, some anomalies may indeed be filtered out as trivial, but a purely technical approach with very stiff standards could create needless false alarms. It is a naive hope that anomalies that survived such an initial technical filter could be taken up in the Agency without reference to political implications. The concern underlying this suggestion, however, is valid: in any organization, some political considerations may detract from the performance of its functions. On the other hand, organizations function in a political context that makes their existence and working possible. Assuming that politics is only a disruption and that "technical" approaches and criteria can avoid politics shows a failure to appreciate this fact.<sup>10</sup> The challenge is to find a formula that will minimize extraneous political considerations.

Some aspects of this sort of problem, such as the composition and powers of the main Agency organs, membership, financing, and personnel policies, will be dealt with in the second section of this study. For the moment, only one broad matter will be touched on: the evolution of the organization.

All organizations are affected by developments in their environment. The spread of nuclear technology, the increase in the number of states in the international community and the rise of the Third World have forced the Agency to adapt. These have affected the strength and the identity of constituencies within the Agency, and how specific issues have been approached as a result. The balance between safeguarding and other functions, the composition of the staff, and the composition of the Board of Governors have also been affected. While these changes have not necessarily compromised the safeguards function, they have affected it, and may create difficulties in the future. Although it is to some degree a distortion, the idea that the Agency has been subject to an increasing "politicization" is a sign of the problem. The response has been concern over the changing character of representatives and of procedures on the